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I. INTRODUCTION

Justice Robert Jackson, about to serve as the chief prosecutor of Nazi
officers charged with war crimes in the Nuremberg trials, calmly appealed
to transcendent values amid the clamor for swift retribution.' With trials
of accused conspirators in the September 11, 2001 attacks approaching,
Justice Jackson's words bear repeating:
[I]n all events the Judges must be above policy pressures by any
nation .... We must not use the forms of judicial proceedings to
carry out or rationalize previously settled political or military
policy. Farcical judicial trials conducted by us will destroy
confidence in the judicial process as quickly as those conducted 2by
any other people.... Courts try cases, but cases also try courts.
Cases try countries too. Perhaps for the first time since the Nuremberg
trials, trials of persons accused of violating the laws of war will test our
values in ways that ordinary trials cannot. The pressures on the military
1. Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson, Address at the Washington Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (Apr. 13, 1945), in 39 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 10, 15 (1945). For a
discussion of Justice Jackson's crucial role in both the creation of the Nuremberg tribunals and the
trials that followed, see Henry T. King, Jr., Robert Jackson's Vision for Justice and Other
Reflections of a Nuremberg Prosecutor,88 GEO. L.J. 2421 (2000) (book review).
2. See supra note 1.
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tribunals appointed after 9/11 match those borne by the tribunals that
heard the cases of Nazi and Japanese war criminals. Most observers
believe that the post-World War II trials contained appropriate procedural
safeguards to ensure those deciding the fate of the accused were shielded
from the pressure to convict at all costs. The central question explored in
this Article is whether the current military tribunal system similarly has
sufficient checks against the fallibilities of human nature.
The controversy over the post-9/ 11 military tribunals highlights certain
misconceptions about the U.S. Constitution and the role of courts in
vindicating fundamental rights.3 Many Americans have become
accustomed to thinking of the Constitution as the repository of all
transcendent truths; and of courts as the guardians of every right. Yet the
Constitution neither codifies every fundamental right, nor pretends to
address every scenario. Nor does it ask courts to intervene in every
significant dispute. The Framers recognized the need to strike a balance
between limitations on government to protect the rights of the governed,
on one hand, and the flexibility needed for governing bodies to act for the
"General Welfare," on the other. In times of threats to national security,
the Framers designated Congress, not the judicial system, as the primary
(if not exclusive) check on executive powers. If Congress enacts
legislation setting limits that the executive branch proceeds to ignore, then
courts may have a role to play-but not before.
This Article considers whether the current military tribunal system
satisfies the U.S. Constitution, but nevertheless falls short of reflecting
transcendent values rooted in objective truths. Prosecution of U.S. military
personnel need not track the constitutional protections afforded to
civilians, but no one contends that our armed forces should receive
anything less than fair trials in a system accommodating the peculiar
interests of our armed forces. Likewise, the trials of alleged unlawful
combatants for crimes against the law of armed conflict follows its own set
of rules. Yet, that does not mean the Framers intended prosecutions in
military tribunals to provide second-class justice. The Framers simply
recognized that, because of the peculiar status of military affairs, the same
rules that applied in the civilian system cannot be superimposed on
military commissions. Instead, by giving Congress the specific authority
to promulgate rules in this area, the Constitution entrusts to Congress the
job of ensuring that the trials of persons in these non-civilian systems are
fair. In establishing the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress has
3. The U.S. Supreme Court has used the terms "military commissions" and "military
tribunals" synonymously. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1952). For purposes
of consistency, this Article uses the term "military tribunal" throughout.
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ensured that trials of members of the U.S. armed forces are fair. To the
extent that Congress has fallen short of its obligation to serve as a check
on the executive branch, it, until recently, has been in the realm of military
tribunals outside the jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Specifically, this Article asks whether the current military tribunal
system lacks sufficient checks to ensure just verdicts, especially where the
charges are punishable by death or life imprisonment. The answer to this
question requires not only a thorough analysis of the pertinent
constitutional text and the U.S. Supreme Court precedent interpreting it,
but also a review of theological and philosophical principles underlying
the U.S. Constitution.
Identifying these underlying principles is critical. In the 9/11
Commission Report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States stressed a number of issues that Americans must begin
to understand about the threat we face.4 The Report emphasizes that
Americans must communicate with the Muslim community abroad about
the values for which we stand.5 Although the American message may be
offered in many ways, one thing is certain: the world will pay closest
attention to the message we send by what we do. Although we should not
pander to other countries, we should search deeply within ourselves to
determine the components we believe are essential to any procedural
system designed to do justice. If we decide that impartiality of the
decision-maker is essential to ajudicial system, then we should find a way
to provide procedural checks to serve as a buffer between the prosecutors
and the judges. The lay jury perhaps offers the ideal procedural check, but
alternative systems may advance the same goal as a jury.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part II provides an overview of the
current military tribunal system. Part Ill addresses the relevant
constitutional provisions and precedent addressing both the right to a jury
trial in capital cases and the government's power to try persons by military
tribunal. Part IV explores the transcendent principles associated with the
right to a jury trial. That discussion involves not only the historical roots
of the jury system, but also how the jury implicates broader principles
inherent in any system that seeks justice. Part IV also briefly compares the
jury's role with systemic checks employed in systems outside the AngloAmerican tradition to identify alternative ways of achieving the purpose
that the jury fills in our criminal justice system. Then, Part IV continues
by examining the foundations for the government's war powers and, in
4. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 374-77 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].

5. Id.
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particular, the power to order trial by military tribunal of persons deemed
to have violated the laws of war. As with the analysis of the right to a jury
trial, this section considers both the theological and philosophical
underpinnings of war powers in general and military tribunals in
particular. Finally, Part V analyzes whether the current military tribunal
structure furthers the core principles that Congress should protect in its
capacity as the sole check on the executive branch in this arena, even
without a specific constitutional mandate to do so.
II. THE PROBLEM: CURRENT STRUCTURE OF MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
OVERVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE

A. OriginalComposition of Tribunals UnderDepartment of
Defense Order
On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense issued Military
Commission Order No. 1 entitled "Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War against
Terrorism."6 The Order dictated that the tribunals would be composed of
three to seven "commissioned officers" of the U.S. armed forces.7 A vote
of two-thirds of the tribunal would suffice to convict or sentence the
accused except for imposition of the death penalty, which had to have a
unanimous vote.8 The order allowed for review by a panel of military
officers before final review by the Department of Defense and the
President.9
Consistent with the Order, the only persons appointed to serve on the
tribunals have been military officers.'" Some civilians were selected to
serve on the Review Panels-the bodies originally designed to review the

6. Military Commission Order No. I (Mar. 21, 2002), http://www.defenselink.rri/news/
Mar2002/d2002032 1ord.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
7. Id. § 4(A)(2).
8. Id.§ 6(F).
9. Id.§ 6(H)(4)-(6).
10. See U.S. Dep't of State, Defense Department Picks Officials for Military Tribunal Posts
(Dec. 30, 2003), http:// usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2003/Dec/31-861825.html (last visited Oct.
3, 2006); Military Commission Instruction No. 9 (Dec. 26, 2003), http://www.defenselink.milU
news/Jan2004/d20040108milcominstno9.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (detailing the procedures
and responsibilities of the review panel for the military commissions). Cf Press Release, Dep't of
Defense, Military Commission Review Panel Members to be Designated and Instruction Issued
(Dec. 30,2003), http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031230-0822.html (last visited Oct.
3, 2006).
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record of proceedings and judgment of a tribunal." These persons,
however, have become officers of the U.S. armed forces pursuant to a
statute that permits the President to appoint persons to become military
officers during national emergencies.12
In July 2004, the government began to issue charges
against persons captured and held as "unlawful combatants."' 3 The

11. See 10 U.S.C. § 603 (2004); see also Exec. Order No. 13,321,68 Fed. Reg. 74,465 (Dec.
17, 2003).
12. See 10 U.S.C. § 603 (2004); see also Exec. Order No. 13,321, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,465 (Dec.
17, 2003).
13. Under the laws of armed conflict, one who is a legal combatant may not be punished for
the act of fighting on behalf of the nation-state with which it is identified. This principle is
memorialized in the Fourth Geneva Convention on Treatment of Prisoners. Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 4, Feb. 2, 1956,6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Article
4 of this Convention provides four factors that must be satisfied for someone to qualify as a legal
combatant:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The person must be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
The person must have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
The person must be carrying arms openly; and
the person must be conducting their operations within the laws and customs
of war.

Id.Commentators have expressed differing views on whether persons captured in Afghanistan are
unlawful combatants. CompareDerek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the PresidentBound by the Geneva
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97 (2004) (arguing that the President is bound and should do
so for reasons of better national security and international relations); and David Sloss, Availability
of US.Court to Detainee at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base-Reach of Habeas Corpus-Executive
Power in War on Terror-Rasul v. Bush, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 788, 796-97 n.85
(2004) (arguing that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions do apply to Taliban and al-Qaeda
operatives), with Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda and Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees,
Unlawful Belligerency, and the InternationalLaws ofArmed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1 (2004).
Some see a difference between al-Qaeda affiliates and Taliban members. See, e.g., Luisa Vierucci,
Prisonersof War or ProtectedPersons qua Unlawful Combatants? The JudicialSafeguards to
which GuantanamoBay DetaineesAre Entitled?, 1 J. INT'LCRIM.JUST. 284,291-92 (2003). In any
event, the charges filed to date against those to be tried in the military tribunals assert conspiracy
to commit war crimes before the fighting in Afghanistan. Under any interpretation of the laws of
war, the accused can be tried for offenses separate from the fighting in which they were captured.
See Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1946). Furthermore, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia has ruled that, at least with regard to persons such as Salim Ahmed Hamdan,
who allegedly supported al-Qaeda, the accused is an unlawful combatant that may be tried by
military tribunal. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006) (holding that Hamdan could not be tried outside the Geneva Convention for conspiracy to
commit offenses against the law of war, but suggesting that actual charges of violating laws of war
as an unlawful combatant could be different). See also infra text accompanying notes 264-79.
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charges filed to date assert numerous violations of the laws of armed
conflict committed by "unlawful combatants."' 4 The tribunals formed to
try the initial cases included only members of the U.S. armed forces. 5
Although Review Panels include some civilians, these persons have been
appointed by the President as officers of the United States armed forces to
validly serve on these panels. 16
B. Composition of Tribunals UnderNew Legislation
On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 7
that trials before military tribunals on the charges in question were
unconstitutional. The Court in Hamdan made clear, among other points
discussed in more detail below,18 that the lack of explicit congressional
authorization for the tribunals was central to its holding.9 Congress has
since enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006.20
As with the earlier procedures, the composition of military tribunals is
limited to commissioned officers in the armed forces. 2' A military judge
will be assigned to each tribunal but will not vote.22 Each tribunal must
have, except in cases in which the death penalty may be imposed, at least
five members.23 For any conviction and sentence of over ten years in
prison, three-fourths of the tribunal must vote in favor of such

14. See, e.g., Hamdan Charge Sheet, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040714hcc.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (charging Salim Ahmed Hamdan with conspiracy to
commit the offenses of attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged
belligerent; destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism); Hicks Charge
Sheet, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040610cs.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006)
(charging Australian David Matthew Hicks with conspiracy, attempted murder by an unprivileged
belligerent, and aiding the enemy); al-Qosi Charge Sheet, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jun2004/d20040629AQCO.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (charging Ibrahim Ahmed Mahmoud alQosi with conspiracy to commit the offenses of attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects;
murder by an unprivileged belligerent; destruction of property by an unprivileged belligerent; and
terrorism).
15. See supra text accompanying note 10.
16. Dep't of Defense, Military Commissions, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/
commissions biographies.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2006) (listing members of the review panel
along with a short biography). As to the reason that these members of the Review Panels are
nevertheless also now members of the U.S. Armed Forces, see supra text accompanying note 12.
17. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
18. See infra notes 264-93 and accompanying text.
19. See Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2759.
20. S.3930, 109th Cong. (2006).
21. Id. § 948i.
22. Id.§ 948j.
23. Id.§ 948m.
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punishment. 4 For the death penalty to be imposed, the tribunal must have
twelve members who vote unanimously in favor of death.25
Review of military tribunal proceedings begins with the convening
authority and can be appealed to a newly created Court of Military
Commission Review that will be composed-of military judges.26 Should
the military court's judgment be appealed, then the case is appealable to
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit. 27 The Supreme
Court may then grant certiorari to review the case. 8
Il. NECESSARY BACKGROUND: RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONCERNING AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO A JURY AND THE
GOVERNMENT'S WAR POWERS

This Article concentrates on the propriety of trying persons accused of
crimes against the laws of armed conflict in a system that lacks a jury or
alternative procedures to promote impartiality in deciding the fate of the
accused. Tension arises between the rights of the individual to a just trial
and the government's powers to protect national security by trying and
punishing persons accused of violating the laws of armed conflict. Because
the use of a lay jury is the primary means in the American criminal justice
system to ensure the impartiality of the decision-maker, this Article
explores that right in depth. The Article also explores the government's
war powers. By exploring these rights and powers individually, and then
discussing their interaction in times of threats to national security, we may
better appreciate the values at stake in the military tribunals debate.
A. ConstitutionalProvisionsand Precedenton the Individual's
Right to a Jury
1. Pertinent Constitutional Provisions Concerning Jury Trials in
Criminal Cases
The right to a trial by jury in criminal cases is guaranteed both in the
Articles of the U.S. Constitution and in the Bill of Rights. Article 1II,
section 2 provides that "[t]he trial of all crimes, except in cases of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.§ 949m(b)(3).
S.3930, 109 Cong. § 949m(b)(2).
Id. §§ 950a-f.
Id. § 950g.
Id.
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impeachment, shall be by jury ... "29 The Fifth Amendment provides as
follows: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when
in actual service in time of War or public danger.... "3 0
The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ....
2. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent On the Scope of Criminal Jury Trials
The U.S. Supreme Court has on several occasions addressed the
accused's right to a jury trial in cases involving trials before military
tribunals. This Article reviews those cases at length in the following
section.32 An even greater body of case law addresses the right to a jury in
non-military trials. These cases, which illustrate the central role of the jury
in the American judicial system, can be grouped into four categories. The
first category includes cases involving aliens accused of crimes within the
United States. The second category represents the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the extent of an accused's right to a jury when charged
with serious crimes within the consular jurisdiction of the United States in
other countries. The third category of cases, typically called the "insular
cases," deals with an accused's jury right in island territories acquired by
the United States in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century.
Finally, the fourth category includes cases where the Court considered
whether the jury right was applicable to trials in state courts by
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Although this last category is the best known, the
other categories offer valuable insights into the principles at issue.
a. Aliens Within the United States
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court considered whether the
right to a jury trial in criminal cases extended to aliens within the United
States.33 In Wong Wing v. United States, the petitioners were Chinese
laborers arrested for being in the United States unlawfully.3 4 At that time,
Chinese laborers found to be in the United States unlawfully would be
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 94-279.
33. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,238 (1896).
34. Id. at 239.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

imprisoned and subjected to hard labor for up to a year before being
deported.35
Although the Court acknowledged Congress's authority to deport such
aliens, it held that subjecting them to hard labor without trial by jury
denied them due process and equal protection.36 The pertinent language of
the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[Nor] shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
37
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The Court had already ruled that the term "person" in the Fourteenth
Amendment extended constitutional safeguards not just to American
citizens, but also to anyone located within the United States.3" The Court
in Wong Wing reasoned, therefore, that "no person can be held to answer,
without presentment or indictment by a grand jury, for any crime for
which an infamous punishment may be imposed by the court."39 Because
the Chinese laborers were subject to hard labor pending deportation, the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment required the government to provide
a jury trial to decide the legal immigration status of the laborers.
b. Consular Court Jurisdiction
In the same period as the alien cases, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a
different question related to the scope of an accused's right to a jury trial
when charged with serious crimes. At that time, the United States tried
foreign nationals who had been charged with crimes committed overseas
under U.S. jurisdiction in consular courts rather than the courts of the other
country. A British national, Ross, enlisted in the crew of an American
merchant vessel and was tried and convicted in a consular court for a
crime committed when the vessel was docked in Yokohama harbor.4 ° The
Supreme Court rejected Ross's argument that he was entitled to ajury trial
by holding that the U.S. Constitution has effect "within the United States"
only.4" The rights under the Constitution "apply only to citizens and others
within the United States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged
offenses committed elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary
' Furthermore, the Court noted the impracticality of
sojourners abroad."42
35. Id. at 235.
36. Id. at 238.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
38. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
39. Id.at 234 (citing Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417,428 (1885), in which the Court declared
that hard labor is infamous punishment and requires a trial before a person can be sentenced to hard

labor).
40. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453,454 (1891).
41. Id.
42. Id.The petitioner argued that the deck of an American vessel is constructively considered
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requiring every criminal trial abroad to undergo a presentment to the grand
jury followed by a trial by a petit jury.43
c. The Insular Cases
Like Ross, the insular 44 cases presented another opportunity for the
Court to examine whether the right to a jury trial had to be applied
extraterritorially.45 In deciding that defendants in criminal jury trials in the
U.S. island territories had no right to a jury, the Court discussed two
reasons for distinguishing between those tried in admitted states and those
tried in new territories. First, the courts created to administer justice in the
territories arose not from Article LI but rather from Article IV, § 3 of the
U.S. Constitution, that empowers Congress to make "Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
' Second, Congress's power under Article IV,
United States."46
§ 3 to
administer the territories is subject to limitations.47 In Dorr v. United
States,4" plaintiffs sought a jury trial in the Philippines, which had just
been ceded to the United States after the end of the Spanish-American War
in 1898.' 9 The plaintiffs argued that wherever the power and jurisdiction
of the United States extends, the laws of the United States must also
extend."0 However, the Philippines had not been incorporated into the
United States by congressional action." The Court stated that until
Congress incorporated the Philippines as a territory, rights under the U.S.
Constitution are applicable only as Congress sees fit to apply them.52
territory of the United States. However, the Court noted the limits to this argument: the protections
of the U.S. Constitution cannot be invoked until the ship is in territorial waters of the United States.
See id.
43. Id. The holding in Ross has now been superseded by later treaties. See RESTATEMENT OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 422 (1987); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
44. "Insular" derives from the Latin "insula" (fem. nom. sg.), a noun meaning island.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/
search?q=insular.
45. See Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Ocampo v. United States, 234
U.S. 91 (1914); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Kepner v. United States, 190 U.S. 100
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182
U.S. 392 (1901); The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
46. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
47. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 142.
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id.at 142.
51. Id.at 143.
52. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 143. The Court noted, moreover, that the treaty between the United
States and Spain ending the hostilities refrained from incorporation, and a federal statute expressly
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The Court in Dorr emphasized that a reliable system of jurisprudence
and criminal procedure already existed in the Philippines, namely the civil
law tradition imported from the Spanish. 3 The system of trial byjury was
uniquely part of the common law of England and not part of the civil law
tradition of other European countries. 4 As the Court observed:
If the right to trial by jury were a fundamental right which goes
wherever the jurisdiction of the United States extends... it would
follow that, no matter what the needs or capacities of the people,
trial by jury, and in no other way, must be forthwith established,
although the result may be to work injustice and provoke
disturbance rather than to aid the orderly administration ofjustice 5
The Court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
does not automatically extend to the territories under Congress's power
under Article IV, § 3 of the U.S. Constitution. 6 Therefore, the right to a
jury trial could be limited by Congress in territories and possessions.
d. Applicability of Jury Right to States Through the
Fourteenth Amendment
In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the
applicability of the jury provisions in the Bill of Rights to the States
a
through the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Below is 57
selection of the key decisions, beginning with Palko v. Connecticut,

where the Court in dicta suggested that the right to a jury trial would not
be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The Court followed Palko with Duncan v. Louisiana,58 where the Court
held that the right to ajury trial did apply to the states, and concluded with
the more recent decisions dealing with sentencing.
(1) Palko v. Connecticut
In Palko v. Connecticut 9 the Court directly faced the question whether
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applied to state
excluded the application of the Constitution and laws of United States to the Philippines. Id. at 148.
53. Id. at 148.
54. See generally MAxIMuS LESSER, HISTORY OF THE JURY SYSTEM 100-62 (1894).
55. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 148.
56. Id. at 149.
57. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
59. Palko, 302 U.S. at 319.
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prosecutions by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. In answering the
question, the Court addressed other rights of the accused, including the
right to a jury trial. Thus, the case provides a useful reference point in the
evolution of the Court's view of the right to jury trial.
The defendant in Palko had been indicted for first degree murder.6" A
jury found him guilty of second degree murder.6 The state appealed and
the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for
a new trial.6 2 On remand, the defendant objected to the new trial on the
grounds of double jeopardy under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The trial court overruled the objection, and a jury found the defendant
guilty of first degree murder. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
conviction despite the defendant's argument that the entire Bill of Rights
applied to states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 In ruling, the
Court observed:
The right to trial by jury and immunity from prosecution except as
a result of an indictment may have value and importance. Even so
they are not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty. To
abolish them is not to violate a "principle ofjustice so rooted in the
traditions and consciences of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental." Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain
that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible
without them. 6
(2) Duncan v. Louisiana
Three decades after the Palkodecision foreshadowed a contrary result,
the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana65 decided that the right to a jury was
indeed applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.66 The
defendant in Duncan had been charged with simple battery, a charge that
carried a maximum penalty of two years in prison. Duncan's request for
60. Id. at 320.
61. Id. at 321.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 322.
64. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (citations omitted). In 1937, this decision followed the generation
of cases that had limited the application of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (addressing the Privileges and Immunities Clause only).
The doctrine of incorporation had not yet been applied broadly to encompass the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments. However, the Palko Court did recognize one area where state statutes may not
abridge the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause: First Amendment rights. Palko,302 U.S.
at 324.
65. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
66. Id. at 149.
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a jury trial had been denied on the ground that the Louisiana Constitution
did not permit a jury trial under such circumstances. The trial court found
Duncan guilty and sentenced him to six months in prison. He appealed the
verdict, arguing that he had been deprived of his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury.
Reversing the conviction, the Court in Duncan held the Sixth
Amendment was fundamental to the American scheme of criminal justice
and, as such, essential in state prosecutions67 despite that the Court in
Palko had refrained from holding that juries were essential to all criminal
justice systems.68 The Court acknowledged that same criminal justice
systems, such as the civil law nations in Europe, can administer justice
without a jury.69 In such systems, other procedures and safeguards serve
the same function as the jury does in the American system.7" The Duncan
Court recognized, however, that the American system is one predicated on
the role of the jury in serious criminal cases.71 In other words, one cannot
simply ask in the abstract whether jury trials are essential to a criminal
justice system.72 Instead, one must ask whether, in light of this country's
system as it has evolved, jury trials are essential.73 Framing the issue in the
latter manner, the Court had little trouble answering that jury trials74 are
essential in the American criminal justice system. 75 A system of criminal
justice without the right to a jury trial for serious offenses had never been
applied in the Anglo-American tradition.76
(3) Decisions on a Jury's Role in Sentencing
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning the
accused's right to a jury trial address the ability of judges to sentence
persons following jury verdicts. In Apprendi v. New Jersey,77 the Court
addressed the constitutionality of ajudge's imposition of a sentence based
67. Id. at 150 n. 14. In so ruling, Duncanrejected the previous incorporation analysis typified
by Palko concerning the constitutional procedural safeguards under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and advocated a new analysis.
68. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323-24.
69. See id. at 326 n.3.
70. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 151-52.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 149.
73. Id. at 150n.14.
74. For serious offenses-generally considered those carrying a potential sentence over six
months. See infra text accompanying note 92.
75. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
76. See id. at 153. The Court has commented on the role of the criminal jury in a number of
decisions decided after Duncan.
77. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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on factual determinations made without a jury trial.7" Holding such a
practice unconstitutional, the Court expounded at length on the crucial role
of the jury in providing a necessary buffer between the government and
the accused.79 The Court has reaffirmed Apprendi twice in the last three
years, first in Ring v. Arizona, ° and then in Blakely v. Washington.8' The
Court in each instance has emphasized the role of the jury in the American
scheme of justice.8 2 As it stated in Blakely, "[T]he right to a jury trial...
is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power
in our constitutional structure. Just as suffrage ensures the people's
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, jury trial is
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary."8'3
e. Synthesis of Precedent on Jury Trial Right
As the previous sections demonstrate, the right to ajury trial in serious
criminal cases is among the broadest of constitutional rights. If the right
were essential in all criminal prosecutions, however, one would have
expected the Supreme Court to have held in all scenarios that the accused
has an absolute right to a jury. Yet the Court has in fact concluded
otherwise. The Court recognized in the Consular Cases and the Insular
Cases that a jury may not be required. 4 The Insular Cases, in particular,
78. Id.at 469-77.
79. Id. at 476-81.
80. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
81. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
82. See id. at 305-06; Ring, 536 U.S. at 614-19 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
83. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304-07.
84. Some have questioned the continuing vitality of the ConsularCases. In Reid v. Covert,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld challenges by civilian spouses of active members of U.S. armed
forces to life sentences imposed by courts-martial on charges of murder. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957). The plurality opinion, rejecting the government's argument that the consular courts
upheld in In re Ross supported the use of courts-martial overseas to try the civilian spouses,
dismissed Ross as "a relic from a different era." Id.at 12. The Insular Cases likewise have been
criticized. In UnitedStates v. Pollard,an airline passenger traveling from the U.S. Virgin Islands
to the continental United States was arrested for falsely representing herself as a U.S. citizen in
violation of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. United States v. Pollard, 209 F. Supp. 2d 525,
529 (2002). At trial, the defendant moved to suppress her confession. Id.at 529-30. The trial court
held that her Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights had been violated and that her
detention violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. However, in dicta, the trial court criticized the
InsularCases as they related to how Congress hadjustified their denial of constitutional guarantees
to island possessions acquired shortly after the Spanish-American War. Id.at 540. The Insular
Cases had spawned what was known as the "unincorporation" doctrine. Id."[S]imply put, [the
unincorporation doctrine] holds that the Territorial Clause confers on Congress plenary power over
territories that have not yet been 'incorporated' into the United States." Id. The rationale was
racism. "By 1922, this racist reasoning had been fully adopted by the Court so that it is the locality
that is determinative of the application of the Constitution... and not the status of the people who
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provide important guidance on the rationale for requiring ajury. The Court
there observed that the island territories followed a form of criminal
justice modeled on the European civil law systems. By recognizing such
systems as legitimate alternatives to the Anglo-American model of
criminal justice, the Court thus accepted that a jury trial is not essential to
a scheme of justice so long as the system has alternative procedures to
ensure a fair trial.
Moreover, a careful review of the Court's Fourteenth Amendment
incorporation jurisprudence further indicates that the Court does not view
the right to ajury trial as an exclusive means to justice. In Palko,the Court
observed, as it had in the InsularCases, 5 that criminal justice systems in
countries other than those that follow the Anglo-American model eschew
a jury in favor of other procedural protections.8 6 The Court thus suggested
that the right to a jury trial was not so fundamental as to be within the
"very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."8 7 Later, the Court in
Duncan held that in the American scheme of criminal justice, a jury was
essential to provide justice in prosecutions involving the potential for
serious punishment.8 8 But one should not overlook the subtlety of the
Court's reasoning.89 The Court, in fact, was not abandoning the
recognition that other civilized systems of criminal justice could operate
without a jury.9 ° The Court was merely insisting that, in a system such as
live in it." Id. (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922)). As the Pollard court
continued:
We are also of the opinion that the power to acquire territories by treaty implies
not only the power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the
United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be in what
Chief Justice Marshall termed the "American Empire." There seems to be no
middle ground between this position and the doctrine that if these inhabitants do
not become, immediately upon annexation, citizens of the United States, their
children thereafter born, whethersavages or civilized,are such, and entitled to all
the rights, privileges and immunity of citizens. If such be their status, the
consequences will be extremely serious.
Pollard, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 279). Pollardwas subsequently
reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on other grounds. See United States v.
Pollard, 326 F.3d 397 (2003). The Third Circuit did not address the review of the history of the
Insular Cases. While the Insular Cases remain precedent, they may well be viewed as an
embarrassing chapter in American jurisprudence.
85. See supra note 44-55 and accompanying text.
86. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
87. Id. at 325.
88. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968).
89. Id. at 160-61.
90. Id. at 154-57.
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the American system which is built with the assumption that the jury will
provide a buffer between the State and the accused, a jury must remain
part of the system.9
Therefore, the right to a jury is broad so long as the prosecution is
within the realm of ordinary criminal prosecutions. It extends to anyone,
citizen or alien, accused of a crime carrying more than six months in jail.
The clearest exception to this broad right applies to petty crimes, for which
potential sentences are less than six months.92 Yet it is clear that the
rationale for dispensing with the jury trial applies in certain scenarios in
which the accused has alternate protections ensuring a fair trial.
The next section of this Article addresses the constitutional basis for
the government's war powers. Implicit in the government's power to act
in matters of national security is the power to charge and try persons
accused of violating the laws of armed conflict. Those accused of such
charges often challenge the prosecution on, among other bases, the
deprivation of the right to a jury trial. Although the Court seemed
receptive to such arguments in one of the earliest of such challenges, the
current state of precedent suggests that an accused will have difficulty
challenging a military tribunal on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, as
this Article contends,93 the last word on the procedures for trying persons
in military tribunals should not come from the Supreme Court. The
Framers left to Congress the job of checking the executive branch in
matters of national security. Although a jury may not be the optimal means
of ensuring just trials of persons accused of violating the laws of armed
conflict, Congress should ensure that some procedures are in place to
ensure fair trials.
B. ConstitutionalProvisionsand Precedent Concerning the
Government's Power to Order Trial by Military Tribunal
1. Pertinent Constitutional Provisions on Government's War Powers
The U.S. Constitution allocates powers in matters of war and national
security both to the President and to Congress. The President's powers in
matters of war derive from Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, which
provides that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
91. Id. at 155-58.
92. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1984) (stating that a sentence of
less than six months creates presumption that the offense is a petty offense, but the presumption can
be overcome by other evidence, such as stiff fines, showing that the government does not consider
the offense to be petty).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 443-566.
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and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into actual Service of the United States."94 In addition, Article
II, section 3 enumerates, among other powers of the President, that "he
' Among the laws
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."95
that the President shall execute are laws enacted by Congress concerning
war. Thus, one must examine separately the areas in which the
Constitution empowers Congress to make laws.
Article I, section 8 includes, among the subjects on which Congress is
authorized to make laws, the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises... and provide for the Common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States." In addition, Congress has the power
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
High Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to
that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces.96
Article I, section 9 further recognizes that Congress has the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus but only "when in cases of rebellion or
invasion the public safety may require it." 97
2. U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Concerning the Government's War
Powers, Especially as They Relate to Military Tribunals
Precedent on the constitutionality of the government's ordering trials
by military tribunal falls into three eras-(1) the Civil War era, (2) the
World War II era, and (3) the post-9/1 1 era. As will be shown, each era's
precedent builds on the previous one. Nevertheless, the precedential
patterns may appear inharmonious--even on a purely constitutional
level-unless one searches deeply for a basis on which to reconcile them.
Hence, this section of the Article will conclude with a synthesis of the U.S.
Supreme Court precedent spanning each era. The remainder of the Article

94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10-14

97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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will explore whether, even if the military tribunals are constitutional, these
tribunals-as currently comprised-fall short of transcendent values.
a. Civil War Era
(1) Ex Parte Merryman
The first decision of this era is Chief Justice Roger Taney's decision,
as circuit justice, in Ex ParteMerryman.98 During the Civil War, President
Lincoln declared that military officers seeking to put down the
insurrection, if they encountered "resistance which renders it necessary to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety . .. [were]
authorized to suspend the writ." In Merryman, Chief Justice Taney,
sitting as circuit justice for the territory in which the writ was brought,
considered the legality of the military imprisonment of Secessionist John
Merryman on suspicion of treason."° When the military officer holding
Merryman refused to produce him based on Lincoln's suspension of
habeas corpus, the Chief Justice issued an opinion that he directed to be
delivered to the President.'0 ' In this opinion, Chief Justice Taney ruled that
the President lacked authority to suspend habeas.' 12 In addition, Chief
Justice Taney offered the opinion that, regardless of whether the writ of
habeas could be suspended, Merryman could not be tried before a military
tribunal due to the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial.0 3 In
response, President Lincoln ordered the release of Merryman, although he
continued to have persons arrested and detained without the benefit of
habeas until Congress reconvened.'
(2) Ex ParteMilligan
Subsequently, the entire U.S. Supreme Court addressed the legality of
military tribunals in Ex Parte Milligan.'°5 On May 10, 1865, Lambdin
Milligan was arrested by military authorities and, pursuant to the same
authorization at issue in Merryman, imprisoned to await trial before a
98. ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
99. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, to Winfield Scott,
Commanding General of the U.S. Army (April 27, 1861), http://teachingamericanhistory.
org/library/index.asp?document=414 (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
100. ExParte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
101. Id. at 153.
102. Id.at 152-53.
103. Id.at 149.
104. Id.at 153.
105. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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military tribunal."° Milligan was charged with conspiring against the
United States by planning to seize weapons, free Confederate prisoners,
and kidnap Indiana's governor. 0 7 On October 21, 1864, Milligan was tried8
before a military tribunal, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged.1
Afterward, a federal grand jury inquired into whether Milligan had
violated the laws of the United States."° The grand jury refused to return
an indictment."' Subsequently, Milligan brought a habeas petition
challenging the jurisdiction of the military tribunal and, by extension, the
validity of its death sentence."'
After the end of the Civil War and the death of President Lincoln," 2 the
habeas petition made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court
addressed the constitutionality of trying a citizen before a military tribunal
without a jury." 3 The Court held that, even in time of war and threats to
national security, citizens could not be tried before military tribunals if the
courts remained open." 4 The Court suggested that civil authority in the
state where the person was charged would have to have been overthrown
for trial by military tribunals to be legitimate." 5
The right that the Court deemed most precious, among those that a
military tribunal would deprive a defendant, was the right to a jury trial. 6
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of a grand jury indictment as
a prerequisite for prosecution of a serious crime."' The Court observed,
106. Id. at 6.
107. Id. at 6-7.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 7.
111. Id. at 8.
112. Lee's surrender at Appomattox Courthouse occurred on April 8, 1865, and President
Lincoln died on April 15, 1865. Milligan filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 10,
1865 in the Circuit Court of the U.S. for the District of Indiana. Id. at 7. The circuit court was
divided on whether to grant the petition and, pursuant to an applicable statute existing at the time,
certified such disagreement to the Supreme Court. Id. at 8-9. Pursuant to this statute, the Court
could take up the matter, during its next session, in light of the certification of disagreement among
the circuit court on the proper response to the petition. Id. at 9. The matter thus came before the
Court during the term following the one in which the petition had been filed, i.e., during the 1866
term.
113. See id. at 115-16. The Court concluded that, notwithstanding Congress's legislation
authorizing the President's suspension of the writ, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear a writ of
habeas corpus challenging the jurisdiction of a military commission. Id. Essentially, the Court held
that any other result would permit an intolerable catch-22 in which a person unlawfully deprived
of liberty would have no recourse. See id.
114. Id. at 136.
115. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 136.
116. Id. at 137.
117. Id. at 137-38.
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however, that the Fifth Amendment specifically excludes from its
protection "cases arising in land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of war or public danger."'"18 The Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of a jury trial, the Court believed, was meant to extend to
everyone protected by the Fifth Amendment."' 9 Thus, the Court reasoned,20
those in military service had no right to a speedy and public jury trial.'
But, beyond that exception, the Court was not willing to go further: "All
other persons, citizens of states where the courts are open, if charged
with
'2
crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury.' 1
(3) Synthesis of Key Civil War Era Precedent on Military Tribunals
After the Civil War cases on military tribunals, an accused charged by
a military tribunal would likely be sanguine about the chances of
successfully challenging the constitutionality of the proceedings. Both
Merryman and Milligan suggested that the accused's jury rights would
fully apply in prosecutions by military tribunals. 2 2 Indeed, an accused
could not have asked for more sweeping language favoring an accused's
rights in criminal prosecution-and, in particular, the significance of the
23
jury to the criminal justice system-than the Court provided in Milligan.
Nevertheless, when such challenges arose during World War II, the
accused met responses far different from those received by Merryman and
Milligan.
b. World War HI Era
The constitutionality of military tribunals arose again during World
124
War II and its aftermath. In three decisions-Ex Parte Quirin,

118. Id. at 123.
119. Id.

120. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123.
The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy, required other and
swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common law courts; and, in
pursuance of the power conferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared the
kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for offences
committed while the party is in the military or naval service.
Id.
121. Id.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 100-21.
123. See supratext accompanying notes 100-21.

124. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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Application of Yamashita,125 andMadsen v. Kinsella'26 -the U.S. Supreme
Court provided
a framework within which to judge the validity of military
1 7
tribunals. 1
(1) Ex ParteQuirin
Approximately six months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, eight
men entered the United States after being delivered by Nazi submarines
in two groups at separate points on the East Coast--one group near Long
Island, New York, and the other group at Ponte Vedra, Florida. 2 They
brought with them explosives sufficient to destroy plants and facilities
critical to the Allied war effort. 129 All of the men had lived in the United
States for extended periods before returning to Germany where they were
trained for this mission. 30 At least one of the men was an American
citizen. 3 '
On July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt signed an executive order
creating a military tribunal before which the men were to be tried "for
offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War."' 3 2 The same
order set forth regulations on the manner in which the trials were to be
conducted and in which a judgment of the tribunal would be reviewed.'33
These procedures were bare-bones: evidence was to be admitted if, in the
estimation of the tribunal's President, it would "be probative to a
reasonable man," and a conviction or sentence required a two-thirds vote
of the tribunal's members. 34 A proclamation issued by President
Roosevelt on the same date declared that anyone entering the United States
125. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
126. 342 U.S. 341 (1952).
127. Another U.S. Supreme Court decision from this era addresses the validity of military
tribunals, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), but is less significant than Quirin,
Yamashita, and Madsen because, unlike those cases, the holdings are peculiar to scenarios that are
either unlikely to arise again or otherwise have limited precedential value. In Kahanamoku, the
Court held convictions by military tribunals set up in the wake of the Pearl Harbor bombings
unconstitutional. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. at 324. Although the Court waxes eloquently on the role
of the jury, it does so in the context of determining Congress's intent under the Organic Act by
which it provided for the governance of Hawaii during the period in which it was a territory. See
id. at 319. In other words, the Court's ruling did not rest on a constitutional basis, but instead on
an interpretation of whether the Act permitted military tribunals indefinitely in the territory. See
id.at 324.
128. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 21.
129. Id.
130. Id.at20.
131. Id.
132. Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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during wartime who was charged with committing, attempting, or assisting
with acts of sabotage, espionage, hostile acts, or violations of the law of
war would be subject to the law of war and tried by military tribunals.'35
President Roosevelt appointed four major generals and three brigadier
generals to serve as the judges for the tribunal, 3 6 and appointed military
lawyers to represent the accused. 7 The trial took place at the Justice
Department building in Washington, D.C. 3 For reasons of national
security, the proceedings before the tribunal were closed and any reports
on the proceedings were censored. 39 After three weeks of proceedings in
the trial before the military tribunal, but before the tribunal had heard
closing arguments of counsel, seven of the accused filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.' 4° In a one-paragraph decision, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia denied the petitions on the grounds that,
based on the facts asserted in the petitions and pursuant to the July 2, 1942
proclamation, they were "not privileged to seek any remedy or maintain
any proceeding in the courts of the United States.''
The petitioners then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
U.S. Supreme Court. 42 The Court, within days of the filing, scheduled oral
arguments on the request. 43 Each of the men also appealed and sought a
writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which the Court granted
and heard at the scheduled hearing."

135. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942), available at
http://www.heinonline.org/HOLPage?handle=hein. fedreg/007132&collection--fedreg&id=1 &size
=2. The text of the July 2, 1942, proclamation states:
[A]ll persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the
United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such
nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United States...
through coastal or boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or
attempting or preparing to commit sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals....
Id.
136. Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. at 5103.
137. MICHAEL DOBBS, SABOTEURS 207 (Alfred A. Knopfed., 2004).

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 205.
Id.at215-19.
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19, 23 (1942).
Exparte Quirin, 47 F. Supp. 431 (1942).
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 19-20.
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On July 31, 1942, the Court issued a terse per curiam opinion affirming
' The Court's per curiam opinion stated that the charges
the district court. 45
against the petitioners were charges for which the President was
authorized to order trial before a military tribunal, that the tribunal had
been lawfully constituted, and that the petitioners were in lawful custody
and thus failed to show a basis for a writ of habeas corpus. 146 The Court
noted that it was issuing its decision "in advance of the preparation of a
full opinion
which necessarily will require a considerable period of
, 147
time."
On August 2, 1942, the military tribunal sent its sealed decision to
President Roosevelt. 14' The tribunal sentenced each of the eight men to
death. 4 9 However, the tribunal recommended clemency for two members
of the group because they had cooperated in the capture and arrest of the
others. 5 ' Roosevelt granted clemency for the two, imposing lengthy prison
terms rather than the death sentence, but ordered the six remaining men to
be executed by electrocution. 5 ' Although their military lawyers argued
that trial by a special military tribunal authorized by the President violated
the Articles of War (now known as the Uniform Code of Military Justice),
President Roosevelt dismissed these arguments. 52 As provided by the
terms of the executive order, the President served as the sole reviewing
authority of the sentences.'53 Less than ten days after President Roosevelt
received the record of the tribunal's proceedings, he issued54 the order to
execute the six men whose sentences were not commuted.
On October 29, 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court filed an "extended
opinion" in Quirin. The Court began by emphasizing the limits of its
review. 5 The Court held that when the President detains and orders trials
of persons in his role as Commander-in-Chief "in times of war and of
grave public danger," such decisions could "not be set aside by the courts
without the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution
and laws of Congress constitutionally enacted."' 56 The Court proceeded to
review the constitutional war-making powers of the President and of
145. Id. at 1.
146. Id. at 18-19, 48.
147. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 18.
148. DOBBS, supranote 137, at 253.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 254, 260-65.
Id. at251-55.
DOBBS, supranote 137, at 251-55.
Id.
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
Id. at 25.
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Congress.'57 In so doing, the Court specifically acknowledged the
significance of the President's powers relating to trial by military
tribunals:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the
enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort
have violated the law of war. 5
With this background, the Court defined its task as not to determine
whether the petitioners were guilty, but solely whether trial of the
petitioners before military tribunals on charges of violation of the laws of
war was constitutional.' 59 In addressing this overarching issue, the Court
also engaged several subsidiary issues. These included (1) the difference
1 60
between persons accused of domestic crimes and "unlawful combatants"
accused of violating the laws of war; (2) the extent to which the Milligan
decision controlled; and (3) the effect, if any, of an accused's American
citizenship. 161
The Court cited the Articles of War as Congress's authorization of
military tribunals for the trial of those who violate the laws of war. 162 The
Court then discussed whether the laws of war encompassed the conduct
with which the petitioners had been charged. 163 Unlike lawful combatants
or prisoners of war, unlawful combatants were subject to trial before a
military tribunal for the "acts which render their belligerency unlawful.""6
Among such unlawful acts, the Court observed, was the act of being in an
enemy's territory for the purpose of waging war by destroying
life or
165
property without uniform identifying one as an enemy.
The Court then turned to the question of whether the right to ajury trial
had been violated."6 It first recognized the principle that the U.S.
Constitution had not enlarged the right to a jury trial, but instead had
merely preserved the right as it existed when the U.S. Constitution was
157. Seeid. at 25-29.
158. Id. at 28-29.
159. Id. at 29.
160. The Court alternately used the terms "unlawful combatants" and "unlawful belligerents"
to refer to the same category of persons.
161. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 14-20.
162. Id. at 26-27.
163. Id. at 30-37.
164. Id. at 31.
165. Id.at 31, 37.
166. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38.
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enacted. 67 As the Court noted, trials of petty crimes and certain criminal
contempt charges were examples of instances in which the Sixth
Amendment was not implicated.'68 A jury trial was not available for these
offenses at common law before the U.S. Constitution's ratification. 69
Likewise, the Court found that ample precedent supported the use of
military tribunals to
try persons for violations of the laws of war in
70
America.
colonial
The Court then turned to a nagging question arising from the text of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment explicitly excludes
from its application those serving in the United States armed and naval
forces. 171 The Court recognized that this exception, though not repeated in
the Sixth Amendment, also excluded members of the United States Army
and Navy from enjoying the right to a jury trial. 172 Because the
Constitution's text contained an explicit exception, the petitioners in
Quirin argued that this textual exception was the only one that could
apply. 73 Rejecting the argument, the Court held that explicit textual
exceptions are not necessary "to exclude from the operation of these
provisions cases never deemed to be within their terms."'174 The Court
found anomalous the suggestion that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
withdrew the benefits of grand and petit juries from members of the U.S.
armed forces 7but
extended them to unlawful combatants who violated the
5
laws of war.
The Court then confronted Milligan's statement that trial by military
tribunal of a citizen would never be proper if conducted in a state where
the courts were open. Rather than overruling Milligan, as the government
invited in briefing Quirin,176 the Court limited that decision "as having
particular reference to the facts before it."'7 The Court read Milligan as
dealing with an American citizen who was not an unlawful combatant.'78

167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id.
Id. at41-43.

171. See supra text accompanying note 30.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at41.
Id.
See Brief for the Respondent, Ex Parte Quirin, in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446-53
(1975).
177. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45.
178. Id.
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As such, the Court believed that the decision had no bearing on the legality
of trying unlawful combatants by military tribunal. 79
The Court also rejected the notion that the citizenship of an unlawful
combatant would provide any greater rights than to an alien unlawful
combatant.' One of the petitioners claimed to be an American citizen.''
The Court found the issue to be irrelevant.8 2 If an American citizen assists
an enemy government by entering the United States with the intent to
commit hostile acts, then such a person is an unlawful combatant.8 3 Such
acts violated the laws of war and, regardless of one's citizenship, one
could be tried by a military tribunal for violations of the laws of war.'
(2) Yamashita v. Styer
The next U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning military tribunals'85
was Yamashita v. Styer.186 Yamashita was decided after the end of World
War II hostilities, but before a formal declaration of peace. During the
decisive battles for control of the Pacific theater, Yamashita was the
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial
Japanese Army which was headquartered in the Philippines.'87 After
surrendering, Yamashita was held in U.S. custody and charged with war
crimes resulting from atrocities committed by his troops.'88 The military
commander of the Philippines ordered the trial of Yamashita before a
military tribunal. 8 9 The tribunal found him guilty and sentenced him to
death by hanging. 90
Yamashita sought a writ of habeas corpus, which the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands denied.' 9 ' Yamashita then sought habeas relief in
179. Id.
180. Id. at 37-38.
181. Id. at 20. Herbert Hans Haupt came to the United States when he was five years old. Id.
He contended that he became an American citizen by the naturalization of his parents during his
minority. Id. The government contended that, on attaining his majority, Haupt elected German
citizenship and, even if he had not, his conduct resulted in abandonment of his citizenship. Id.
182. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.
183. Id. at 37-38.
184. Id.
185. The Court had, however, dealt with related subjects between Quirin and Yamashita,
including the highly controversial ruling upholding the President's decision to inter American
citizens of Japanese descent and Japanese aliens in prison camps. See infra text accompanying
notes 469-92 (discussing Korematasu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
186. Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
187. Id. at 31-33 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 13-14.
189. Id. at 5.
190. Id.
191. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 6.
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the Supreme Court.'92 The Court upheld the validity of trial by military
tribunal. Citing Quirin, the Court observed that the U.S. Constitution and
Congress recognized the ongoing authority of military tribunals to try
offenders of the laws of war.'93 The Court repeated its statement from
Quirinthat use of the military tribunal was an "important incident to the
conduct of war" by allowing seizure and punishment of those impeding
"6our military effort" who violated the laws of war.' 94 Expanding on this
view of the usefulness of military tribunals in the war effort, the Court
added:
The war power, from which the [military tribunal] derives its
existence, is not limited to victories in the field, but carries with it
the inherent power to guard against the immediate renewal of the
conflict, and to remedy, at least in ways Congress has recognized,
the evils which the military operations have produced...
(3) Madsen v. Kinsella
Like Yamashita, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Madsen v.
Kinsella 96 followed the end of World War H hostilities and addressed the
constitutionality of military tribunals. Madsen involved the trial of a
military spouse by military tribunal in the area of Germany under U.S.
control in 1949.197 The wife of an Air Force Lieutenant moved to the
American Zone of Occupied Germany in 1947 and lived there on a
military base.' 98 She fatally shot her husband in 1949 and was charged

192. Id. at 4.
193. Id. at 7-8.
194. Id. at 11.
195. Id. at 12. The Court proceeded to reject Yamashita's specific arguments. He had argued,
for instance, that the military tribunal lacked jurisdiction because it had been formed after hostilities
had ended. Id. at 12-14. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that military tribunals had
traditionally conducted trials for war crimes committed during hostilities after cessation of the
hostilities but before a formal declaration of peace. Id. The Court further rejected the argument that
Yamashita could not be relieved of culpability because it was his troops, not he personally, who
committed the atrocities. Id. at 14-17. In addition, the Court rebuffed the challenges to the
widespread use of hearsay testimony in the trial as evidence on which Yamashita was convicted.
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 18-20. By authorizing military tribunals in the Articles of War, Congress
had sanctioned "any use of the military [tribunal] contemplated by the common law of war[,]"
including trial without the evidentiary safeguards imposed in the traditional system of criminal
justice. Id. at 20.
196. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
197. Id. at 343.
198. Id. at 343-44.
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with murder and brought to trial before a military tribunal.' 99 In 1945, the
President had established a U.S. Military Government for Germany within
the territory controlled by America after the end of World War II and
before return of sovereignty to Germany.2" Military tribunals were the
arm of the military government that administered the judicial system.2 °'
These tribunals had authority to enforce the German Criminal Code
against civilians, including dependents of members of the U.S. forces, in
this territory.2 °2
Having been found guilty of murder by the military tribunal of civilian
judges, and having had that conviction affirmed on appeal, the petitioner
in Madsen was transferred to a prison in West Virginia to serve her
sentence. 0 3 From there she petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. 2 ° She
argued that Quirin and Yamashita were not controlling on the
congressional authorization of the tribunals in question because, unlike the
tribunals in those cases, the tribunals in Madsen were post-war tribunals
in territory governed by military authorities and not contemplated by the
Articles of War.20 5 In its analysis, the Court recognized that the Madsen
tribunals did not appear to be implicitly authorized by the Articles of
War.2 6 Accordingly, the Court faced a question that it had not faced in
previous cases: Does the President have authority, independent of
Congress, to establish military tribunals?
The Court found that implicit in the President's powers as Commanderin-Chief was the power to establish military tribunals.20 7 Significantly,
however, the Court observed that Congress, in light of the broader
constitutional grant of powers to make laws on matters of war, could place
199. Id.
200. Id. at 356.
201. See generally Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Timothy C. MacDonnell,
Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Discussion of the Constitutional and
JurisdictionalDistinctionsBetween the Two Courts, 2002 ARMY LAW. 19, 34.
202. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356. The judges on these military tribunals, unlike traditional
military tribunals, were civilians appointed by the U.S. Military Governor for Germany. Appeals
were to another set of civilian judges appointed by the U.S. Military Governor. As the Court
observed, tribunals "of a nonmilitary character" had been established for a variety of reasons,
including the "volume of business, the size of the area, the number of civilians affected, the
duration of the occupation and the need for establishing confidence in civilian procedure." Id. at
358. A code of procedure protected the accused, regardless of whether they were Americans or not,
and by thus subjecting "German and United States civilians to the same procedures[,]" the militarytribunal system "exhibited confidence in... [these] procedures." Id. at 359-60.
203. Id. at 344-45.
204. Id. at 343-46.
205. Id. at 345.
206. See id. at 345-48.
207. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348.
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limits on such military tribunals.2 °8 Because Congress had not limited the
President in this situation, the tribunals were legitimately formed.2 °9
(4) Synthesis of World War 11 Era Precedent on Military Tribunals
The key decisions from the World War II are Quirin and Madsen. In
Quirin,the Court established that for those accused of violating the laws
of war (so-called "unlawful combatants"), trials held before military
tribunals are presumptively constitutional. Contrary to the suggestion of
the Civil War decisions in Merrymanand Milligan,the Court's World War
II decisions narrowly circumscribed the rights of an accused. The analysis
by which the Court upheld the constitutionality of military tribunals
focused on the practices at the time of the U.S. Constitution's
ratification. 21° During that time there were individuals accused who were
tried without a jury in some criminal proceedings; those accused of
violating the laws of war, such as by acting as an unlawful combatant,
were among this group. Nevertheless, Madsen provided an important
qualification on the government's ability to try persons by military
tribunal. The Court in Madsen recognized that Congress could limit the
executive branch by enacting legislation limiting the circumstances or
means by which persons were tried in military tribunals.
In its analysis of the balance of war powers, Madsen illustrates the
approach of the Court in a more famous decision announced within the
same year-Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.211 In Youngstown,
President Truman seized steel mills on the brink of a labor strike,
contending that the continued operation of the mills was essential to
supply troops fighting in the Korean War.2 12 Previously, Congress had
considered and expressly rejected an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act
213
that would have allowed such a seizure in times of national crisis.
Affirming an injunction prohibiting the President from taking control of
the mills, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that Congress's express
rejection of the seizures effectively limited the President's war powers. 2 4
In his celebrated concurring opinion, Justice Jackson summarized the
balance of powers as follows:

208. Id. at 348-54.
209. Id.

210. See supra text accompanying notes 156-84.
211. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

212. Id. at 583.
213. Id. at 586.
214. Id. at 587.
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1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at-its maximum ....
these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said . .

.

In
to

personify the federal sovereignty....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical
matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility....
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb
... . Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is
the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.215
Thus, the Court in both Youngstown and Madsen reached the same
conclusion-that Congress can effectively limit the President's powers in
matters of national security. In Madsen, Congress had not enacted
legislation limiting the President's powers. 6 Thus, the system of military
justice prescribed for occupied Germany withstood constitutional
scrutiny.217 Because in Youngstown Congress had rejected the very action
the President undertook, his action was unconstitutional even though he
acted to promote national security. Therefore, legislation can make a
crucial difference in whether the executive branch's actions can be
challenged.

215. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
216. See supratext accompanying notes 202-15.
217. See supratext accompanying notes 202-15.
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c. 9/11 Era Decisions
(1) September 11, 2001 Attacks, Governmental Response, and Creation
of Military Tribunals for Trials of Those Accused of Taking
Part in the Attacks
On September 11,2001, al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked fourjets and used
three of them as missiles to attack the World Trade Center in New York
City and the Pentagon. 1 8 The passengers of the fourth jet overtook the
terrorists and forced a crash that killed all aboard. 29 Approximately three
thousand persons were killed 221 in the most intense attack on American
soil since Pearl Harbor. In the minds of many, these terrorist attacks
represented a greater threat than the attack sixty years before.2 21
On September 18, 2001, Congress passed a resolution called
Authorization for Use of Military Force. 22 The authorization empowered
the President to "use all necessary and appropriate force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" or those who "harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons., 223 Relying in part on Congress's authorization,
on November 13, 2001, President Bush ordered certain procedures for the
detention, treatment, and trial of non-citizen terrorists suspected of having
ties to terrorist organizations.224
On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense issued Military
Commission Order No. 1 entitled "Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War against
Terrorism.1"225 This order provided a number of procedural safeguards to
the accused.226 Simultaneously, the order provided mechanisms by which
classified information could be protected from disclosure, including
218.
219.
220.
221.

9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 7, 8, 10.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 316.
See, e.g., Nathan Watanabe, Internment, Civil Liberties, and a Nation in Crisis, 13 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 169-70 (2003) (greater number of Americans killed in 9/11 attacks than
Pearl Harbor).
222. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
223. Id.
224. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism," 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at 2001
WL 34773797.
225. Military Commission Order No. 1, supranote 6.
226. Id. § 5.
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prevention of the release of names of covert operatives in the field whose
lives would be endangered by such release. 27 The order dictated that the
tribunals be composed of three to seven "commissioned officers" of the
U.S. armed forces.228 A vote of two-thirds of the tribunal would suffice to
convict or sentence the accused except for imposition of the death penalty,
which would require a unanimous vote.229 The order allowed for review by
a panel of officers before final review by the Department of Defense and
the President.23 °
To date, the only persons appointed to serve on the tribunals have been
military officers. 231 Nevertheless, the government appointed several
civilians as members to serve on the review panels under a statute
permitting the President to appoint civilians to temporary positions as
officers of the armed forces during national emergencies.232
In July 2004, the government began to issue charges against persons
captured and held as "unlawful combatants. 2 33 The charges filed to date
assert a variety of violations of the law of armed conflict, including
offenses committed as unlawful combatants.234 Tribunals have been
formed to try these initial cases and include only members of the U.S.
armed forces. 35 Some civilians were selected to serve on the Review
Panels, the bodies that were supposed to be review the record of the
proceedings and judgment of a tribunal.236 These persons, however, were
appointed as temporary military officers.2 37 Consequently, all persons
appointed to serve on the military tribunals and on the Review Panels
would ultimately answer to the President in his capacity as Commanderin-Chief.

227. Id. § 6(D)(5)(a).
228. Id. § 4(A)(2).
229. Id. § 6(F).
230. Military Commission Order No. 1, supranote 6, § 6(H)(4)-(6).
231. See supra text accompanying note 10.
232. 10 U.S.C. § 603 (2004). Seealso Exec. OrderNo. 13,321,68 Fed. Reg. 74,465 (Dec. 17,
2003).
233. Under the laws of war, one who is a legal combatant may not be punished for the act of
fighting on behalf of the nation-state with which it is identified. For a discussion of the debate
concerning the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants and those who fall within these
categories at the present, see supra text accompanying note 13.
234. See supra text accompanying note 14.
235. See supra notes 10-12, 231-32 and accompanying text.
236. 10 U.S.C. § 603 (2004). See also Exec. Order No. 13,321,68 Fed. Reg. 74,465 (Dec. 17,
2003).
237. See 10 U.S.C. § 603 (2004); see also Exec. Order No. 13,321,68 Fed. Reg. 74,465 (Dec.
17, 2003).
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(2) U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decisions on Detainees
The Supreme Court has issued two recent opinions of note concerning
military tribunals. The U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld238 did not specifically address the legality of military tribunals.
Nevertheless, the plurality decision in Hamdi dealt with the President's
power to detain illegal combatants as one of the incidents of the
executive's war powers. Because the plurality relied on Quirin as
controlling precedent, and because the power to detain is an analogue to
the power to charge, try, and punish persons for violating the laws of
war,239 the decision in Hamdi requires some discussion. After discussing
Hamdi, the focus will turn to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in which the Court
directly addressed the validity of military tribunals.
a. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Yasser Hamdi was born in the United States and lived in Saudi
Arabia.24 ' The government asserted that he was captured in Afghanistan,
without a uniform but brandishing an AK-47 rifle and fighting for the alQaeda/Taliban forces.242 On this basis, the government deemed Hamdi an
"unlawful combatant" and not a prisoner of war.243 Hamdi denied fighting
for the al-Qaedalraliban forces. 2 " The plurality in Hamdi recognized the
President's power to detain illegal combatants, but ruled that the accused
"must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker."245
In upholding Hamdi's detention, the plurality rejected Hamdi's
argument that the Non-Detention Act precluded his detention.2 46 The Court
238. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
239. Id. at 509.
240. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
241. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510.
242. Id. at510, 513.
243. Id. at 516. The Court found that despite the lack of a precise definition of the term
"enemy combatant" (used as a synonym for "unlawful combatant") the government has
made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the "enemy combatant" that
it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was "part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and who
are "engaged in an armed conflict against the United States."
Id.
244. Id. at511-12.
245. Id.at 533.
246. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-18. The Non-Detention Actprovides as follows: "No citizen shall
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held that the requirement in any detention is to have congressional
authorization be satisfied.247 "There can be no doubt that individuals who
fought against the United States as part of the Taliban ... are individuals

Congress sought to target in passing the [Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF)]."48 Significantly, the Court relied on Quirin'sexpression

of the "incidents of war" that are implicit within the government's war
powers.249 "The capture and detention of lawful combatants and the
capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, by 'universal
agreement and practice,' are important incident[s] of war." 5 °
The plurality then addressed Hamdi's argument that Congress had not
authorized an indefinite detention.25
"' The Court rejected this argument first
by stating that it is "an established principle of the law of war that
' Examining the
detention may last no longer than active hostilities."252
AUMF's "necessary and appropriate force" clause, the plurality reasoned
that this clause includes detention of enemy combatants.253 Furthermore,
the plurality noted that because "United States troops are still involved in
active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of
'necessary and appropriate force,' and therefore are authorized by the
AUMF."254 Accordingly, the plurality found that Hamdi's detention was
justified by the AUMF.
Finally, the plurality addressed the due process implications of
Hamdi's inability to have a court rule on the disputed contention of
whether he was an unlawful combatant.255 Here, the plurality analyzed
Hamdi's individual liberty interest and the risk of unchecked detention
becoming a means of oppression.256 In contrast, the plurality
acknowledged the government's strong interests in prosecuting a war and
be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress."
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004).
247. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517. The Court thus held that it was unnecessary to address the
separate question whether the Act applied solely to non-military detentions. Id.
248. Id. at 518.
249. Id.
250. Id. (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28).
251. Id. at 519.
252. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners
of War art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316).
253. Id. at 521.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 528-29. For its analytical framework, the plurality relied on calculus set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, which "dictates that the process due in any given instance is determined by
weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the official action' against the Government's
asserted interest, 'including the function involved' and the burdens the Government would face in
providing greater process." Id. at 529 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
256. Id. at 529-30.
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ensuring that those captured do not return to battle, while also reducing
"process available to alleged enemy combatants" and the "practical
difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like process. 257
Military officers ought not be distracted "by litigation half a world away,
and discovery into military operations would both intrude on the sensitive
secrets of national defense2 58and result in a futile search for evidence buried
under the rubble of war.,
In light of these competing interests, the plurality held Hamdi had the
right to challenge his illegal combatant status but that the proceedings
could be fitted to recognize governmental interests. 9 A "citizen-detainee
seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive
...
a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before
a neutral decision maker."2" "Any process in which the Executive's
factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct
without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate
otherwise falls constitutionally short."26' 1 At the same time, the plurality
recognized "the exigencies of the circumstances may demand that...
enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive."262 The opinion suggested
procedural accomodations such as the relaxation of hearsay rules,
rebuttable presumptions in favor of the government's evidence, and
burden-shifting schemes.263
257. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531-32.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 533.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 537.
262. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. Justice Thomas in dissent contended that the notion of placing
burdens on the executive branch in matters of national security was presumptuous and the Court
should refrain from attempting a different result from the plurality. Id. at 582 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the plurality failed to "consider basic principles of
constitutional structure as it relates to national security and foreign affairs and by using the
balancing scheme of Mathews v. Eldridge." Id. at 579 (internal citation omitted). Justice Thomas
believed that balancing was inappropriate: the Executive's war powers cannot be "balanced away
by this Court." Id. He criticized the plurality for failing to "account for the Government's
compelling interests and for our own institutional inability to weigh competing concerns correctly."
Id. at 579.
263. Id. at 533-34. The Court's other 2004 decisions in cases brought by accused terrorists are
not helpful in evaluating the legitimacy of military tribunals because they were decided on grounds
having to do solely with procedural aspects of habeas corpus jurisprudence. In Padillav. Rumsfeld,
the Court held that the proper defendant in a habeas proceeding is the immediate custodian of the
petitioner, not the Secretary of Defense. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426, 440 (2004). In Rasul
v. Bush, the Court held that persons detained by the executive at Guantanamo Bay had the right to
judicial review of their detention under the habeas statute, even though the United States does not
exercise ultimate sovereignty there. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004).
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b. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,z6 the Supreme Court faced a direct challenge
to the constitutionality of the military tribunals created by the Department
of Defense at the President's direction. Hamdan, a Yemeni national,
reportedly supported al-Qaeda by, among other things, serving as Osama
bin Laden's bodyguard and chauffeur. 265 After being captured in
Afghanistan and transported to the detention center at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, the government ultimately charged Hamdan with conspiracy to
commit offenses against the laws of armed conflict including "attacking
civilians; attacking civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent;
and terrorism." 2" The following overt acts were listed in the charging
document as having been committed by Hamdan in furtherance of the
conspiracy:
(1) he acted as Osama bin Laden's "bodyguard and personal
driver," "believ[ing]" all the while that bin Laden "and his
associates were involved in" terrorist acts prior to and including the
attacks of September 11, 2001; (2) he arranged for transportation
of, and actually transported, weapons used by al Qaeda members
and by bin Laden's bodyguards (Hamdan among them); (3) he
"drove or accompanied [O]sama bin Laden to various al Qaidasponsored [sic] training camps, press conferences, or lectures," at
which bin Laden encouraged attacks against Americans; and (4) he
received weapons training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps.267
After the military tribunal proceedings began, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia Circuit granted Hamdan's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus and stayed the tribunal proceedings. 268 Reversing, the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the military tribunals formed after the 9/11 attacks were
constitutional in light of the Court's Quirin decision and Congress's
Authorization for Use of Military Force. 69
Disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court struck down the
military tribunal proceedings. Characterizing Quirin as the "high-water
264. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
265. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33,35-36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
266. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
267. Id. at 2761.
268. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.C. 2004), rev'd,415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005), rev'd,126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
269. Hamdan, 415 F.3d at 36-38, rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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mark of military power to try enemy combatants for war crimes, 2 71 the
Court believed it unnecessary "to revisit Quirin's controversial
characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional authorization for
military commissions. '2 7' The Court thus refused to rely on the post-9/1 1
Authorization for Use of Military Force, as it had suggested in dicta it
would do in the plurality opinion in Hamdi and as the D.C. Circuit's
opinion did in upholding the government's right to try Hamdan in military
commissions.272
Having thus limited its holding in Quirin,the Court proceeded to treat
the military tribunals in Hamdan as outside congressional authorization.273
The Court observed the basis for trying persons by military tribunal had
to fall within one of the following narrow categories resting on the
common law of war: (1) when martial law has been declared, (2) when a
temporary military government has been established in occupied enemy
territory, or (3) when an illegal combatant is seized while impeding the
prosecution of war and is charged with violating "'the laws and usages of
war cognizable by military tribunals only.' ,,2 74 The Court held that none of
these grounds existed-the first two categories being clearly inapplicable,
and the last being inapplicable because conspiracy (the charge against
of "the laws and
Hamdan) was not an offense clearly recognized as one
2 75
only.
tribunals
military
by
cognizable
usages of war
The Court in Hamdan nevertheless recognized Congress's ability to
authorize military tribunal proceedings, beyond the common law
categories, based on its authority to "'declare War... and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water'

. . .

'to raise and support

270. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2777.
271. Id.at2775.
272. Compare id. at 2774-87, with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004), and
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 36-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
273. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774-98.
274. Id. at 2777. The Court recognized that an enemy combatant could also conceivably be
charged and tried with "'[b]reaches of military orders or regulations for which offenders are not
legally triable by court-martial under the Articles of war."' Id.Moreover, the Court emphasized that
the charges of conspiracy against Hamdan did not fall within any laws in which Congress,
exercising its constitutional authority to define offense against the laws of war, had legislated. Id.
Thus, to charge and try Hamdan by military commission, the Court had to see whether the offenses
with which he was charged were clearly recognized by the common law of war as offenses against
the laws of war. See id. at 2766-77. If so, then he could be tried by military commission
proceedings because Congress has incorporated in the Uniform Code of Military Justice the
common law of war to try persons by military commissions for "certain offenses not defined by
statute." Id. at 2780. However, for such offenses, the Court set a high standard: "When... neither
the elements of the offense nor the range of permissible punishments is defined by statute or treaty,
the precedent must be plain and unambiguous." Id.
275. Id. at 2775-79.
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Armies,' to 'define and punish.. . Offences against the Law of Nations,'
...and

'To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land

and naval Forces ....
"276 Here, Congress had not authorized the military
commissions at issue. 27 7 Because Hamdan could not be tried by military
tribunal, the Court reasoned that he had to be treated as a prisoner of war
entitled to trial procedures consistent with the Geneva Convention relative
to treatment of prisoners. 278 As such, the Court held that Hamdan had to
be tried by court martial procedures consistent with the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.279
(3) Implications of Post-9/11 Decisions
The plurality opinion in Hamdi seems to suggest guidance on the
criteria by which the current military tribunals would be judged, but the
Court's decision in Hamdan went in a different direction. The Court in
Hamdi did not directly address challenges to the validity of the tribunals
because the government had essentially argued that the detainees were not
even entitled to civilian court review of their detentions. The plurality
rejected the government's position but, in so doing, offered
encouragement to those supporting military tribunals. This encouragement
came in at least two ways. First, the plurality relied on Quirinas governing
precedent. s° Second, the plurality found that Congress's September 18,
2004, Authorization for Use of Military Force expressly authorized the
President not only to conduct military engagements, but also to perform
other actions implicit in the carrying out of such engagements.2"' The
plurality further observed that "[t]he capture and detention of lawful
combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants,
by 'universal agreement and practice,' are important incident[s] of war. '' 282
Thus, the plurality appeared to recognize that congressional authorization
to use military force-that is, to engage in war-making
efforts-necessarily included all of the normal incidents of war. The
plurality specifically included within this implicit authorization not only
276. Id.at 2773 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
277. Id.at 2774-75.
278. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2789-99.
279. Id.at 2786-93. Having concluded that the grounds for military commission proceedings
were lacking, the Court proceeded to examine how the current military orders differed with the
requirements of the UCMJ. See id. at 2786-92. The Court further reasoned that the applicable
Geneva Convention required that Hamdan be tried, if at all, in a court martial with the protections
afforded by the UCMJ. See id.at 2793-97.
280. Id.at 2759.
281. Id. at 2760.
282. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (emphasis added).
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the detention of unlawful combatants, but also the trial of such
combatants.
Yet the Court in Hamdan departed from the path that the plurality's
dicta in Hamdi suggested it would follow. The Court explicitly held that
the post-9/11 Authorization for Use of Military Force was insufficient to
represent the kind of congressional authorization necessary to try persons
in military tribunals under Congress's delegated power to make rules for
such trials.283 Moreover, the Court appeared to limit (or abandon) Quirin
where the Court had found authorization for military tribunals in the
Articles of War (now Uniform Code of Military Justice).28 This left
President Bush with two realistic alternatives for seeking trial of the
alleged enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay: (1) seek more
explicit congressional authorization for trials by military tribunal; and (2)
charge the accused with offenses against the laws of war that clearly fit
within the parameters established by the Court and that could be tried in
military tribunals under the common law of war. As explained below,
President Bush chose the first alternative, and has successfully achieved
legislation providing explicit authorization for the trials under detailed
procedures established by Congress.285
4. Synthesis of Civil War, World War II, and Modem Precedent on
Constitutionality of Military Tribunals
The Civil War cases are difficult to reconcile with later precedent. In
particular, Milligan suggested that as long as the civilian courts are open,
military tribunals in which the accused faces trials without a lay jury are
constitutionally suspect. The World War II era decisions in Quirin and
Yamashita, however, circumscribed the sweeping language of Milligan.
Although the Court did not expressly overrule Milligan, it effectively
limited that case to its narrow factual context. Especially in Quirin, the
Court made clear that unlawful combatants being tried before military
tribunals for violating the law of armed conflict would have great
difficulty mounting any constitutional challenge to such trials. 86 The
Court, moreover, specifically rejected the claim that trials in that manner
violated an accused's right to a jury trial.287 The 2004 plurality opinion in
Hamdi appeared to reaffirm the validity of Quirin. But the Court's

283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See supranotes 280-82 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 286-93 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part V.
Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-39 (1942).
Id. at 35-36.
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Hamdan decision not only breathed new life into the seemingly defunct
Milligan decision, 88 but sharply limited Quirin.289
The Court's decision in Madsen offered an early clue as to the most
likely basis on which the current military tribunals could be limited by
procedures other than those currently in effect. The Court in Madsen
recognized that, in light of the shared powers between Congress and the
President in matters of war, military tribunal procedures created by the
executive branch would be more susceptible to challenge if they conflicted
with Congress's position. 29 Some commentators have argued that the
Geneva Convention Relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War-which
was entered into after the Quirin decision-requires the United States to
try persons imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay according to court-martial
procedures. 29' The Court in Hamdan agreed with this argument to the
extent that Congress had not explicitly authorized trial by military tribunal
and where one of the grounds for common-law trial by military tribunal
was lacking.292
The point of Hamdan is clear: if Congress believes that the military
tribunal structure should be different from the one the executive branch
has developed, then Congress should enact legislation setting forth the
minimum procedural protections it deems appropriate. The U.S.
Constitution leaves to Congress, not the courts, the job of providing a
check on the executive in this realm. 293 The remainder of this Article
explores whether any values are implicated in the tribunals' proceedings
that would warrant congressional intervention. This Article also considers
whether the recently enacted Military Commission Act of 2006 protects
any such values.

288. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006) (relying on Milligan); id. at 2775
n.25.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 196-217.
290. See, e.g., Jinks & Sloss, supra note 13, at 97 (arguing that the President is bound by the
Conventions and should follow them for reasons of better national security and international
relations); Sloss, supra note 13, at 796 (arguing that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions do
apply to Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives).
291. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-65.
292. See supratext accompanying notes 264-79.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 264-79.
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TV. DIGGING DEEPER: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES AT
STAKE IN THIS DEBATE

A major premise of this Article is that not every significant right is one
that courts can or should enforce-at least not without Congress acting
first. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution knew that the best interests of
the country would not be served by hamstringing the two branches of
government (executive and legislative) responsible for national security.
Nevertheless, the Constitution does contemplate Congress serving as a
check on the executive branch in such matters. Enacting legislation to deal
with particular circumstances is far easier than having rules set in
constitutional stone.
None of this suggests that individual rights in times of war are any less
weighty than in times of peace. It does mean, however, that protections for
enemy combatants tried by authorized military tribunals on charges
carrying serious penalties will have to come from congressional action, not
from the Bill of Rights. If Congress passes legislation and the executive
branch ignores it, then courts could properly play a role in this arena.
The remainder of this Article seeks to uncover the transcendent
principles at issue in the debate over military tribunals of persons charged
as illegal combatants. These are the principles that existed before the U.S.
Constitution itself. By considering the principles upon which the Framers
based the constitutional right to a jury and the government's war powers,
we may better appreciate the stakes in the current debate. Even more
importantly, we may find in this process a way to accommodate these
principles even if it takes a form other than the procedures with which we
are most familiar.
First, this section will address the transcendent principles underlying
the right to a jury trial; and will show, the right itself is one manifestation
of a deeper set of values that can be protected in different ways. In other
words, although the jury is the preferred mechanism for protecting these
values in the Anglo-American tradition, other procedural schemes can
vindicate the same values.
The principles underlying the government's war powers are then
explored in detail. Again, the purpose is to appreciate the values and
principles the Framers sought to promote by granting extraordinary
powers to the President and to Congress in times of threats to national
security. Moreover, this section introduces the philosophical and
theological principle known as the "common good." This
principle-represented in the U.S. Constitution by the phrase "General
Welfare"-becomes important in understanding not only the war powers
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but also the manner in which tension between individual and societal
values may be resolved by governmental authority.
Finally, with these principles in mind, Part V of this article seeks to
reconcile the tension between the values underlying the individual's right
to a jury trial and the government's war powers. That part concludes with
a proposal seeking to vindicate the values underlying both sets of
constitutional provisions.
A. TranscendentPrinciples Underlying the Right to a Jury Trial
1. The Jury as Part of Governmental Checks and Balances
The Founding Fathers undoubtedly were familiar with the historical
roots of the jury in the English legal system.294 They would have known
that the genesis of the Magna Cartain 1215 was a controversy involving
the king's power. 295 English barons led by Archbishop Stephen Langton
forced King John to sign the famous document by which he recognized
limits on the king's powers.296 Chief among these limits was the right of
the barons to be free from imprisonment without a judgment of their
peers.297 The key provision of Magna Cartastates:
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights
or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in
any other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send
others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals ... 2. 98
Likewise, many of the Framers of the U.S. Constitution would have
studied Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland
and thereby learned that the right to jury, with its genesis in Magna Carta,
developed in the common law as a right of each person regardless of social
station. 299 Blackstone placed the right to a jury trial among the chief
protections of free persons: "The trial by jury, or the country, per patriam,
is also that trial by the peers, of every Englishman, which, as the grand
bulwark of his liberties, is secured to him by the great charter [i.e., Magna
294. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late EighteenthCentury American PoliticalThought, 78 AM. POL. Scl. REv. 189, 189-97 (1984).
295. See JOHN C.H. Wu, FOUNTAINS OF JUSTICE 68-70 (1959).
296. See id.
297. See id.at 68.
298. Magna Carta § 39.
299. Lutz, supra note 294, at 189-97.
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Carta]."300 Furthermore, Blackstone emphasized this right to a trial byjury

in capital cases:
But the founders of the English laws have with excellent forecast
contrived, that no man should be called to answer to the king for
any capital crime, unless upon the preparatory accusation of twelve
or more of his fellow subjects, the grand jury: and that the truth of
every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment,
information, or appeal, should afterwards be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors,
indifferently chosen, and superior to all suspicion.3 '
Juries served as a buffer between the king and the people. Blackstone
continued:
[I]n times of difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended from
the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the crown, in
suits between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one
individual and another, to settle the metes and boundaries of private
property. Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the
liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the crown.3" 2
The Framers' enthusiasm for the jury system resulted in part from the
trial in 1735 of John Peter Zenger, an editor and printer of a New York
newspaper.30 3 Zenger had criticized the Royal Governor of New York for
removing a chief justice. 3° Zenger was charged with seditious libel. 0 5
Three grand juries refused to indict. 3 6 The Attorney General of New York
then charged Zenger by information and thus bypassed the grand jury.30 7
Andrew Hamilton, Zenger's defense counsel at trial, argued that the jury
had a right to challenge both law and fact.3" A jury acquitted Zenger and
his trial became a symbol of the power of the jury to protect individuals
300. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch. 27 (17651769).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See generallyAlbert Alschuler& Andrew Deiss,A BriefHistory ofthe CriminalJury in
the UnitedStates, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994).
304. Id. at 871-72.
305. Id.at 872.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.at 873.
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from the power of the king and his agents. 3" To circumvent similar
verdicts, the British extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts-which lacked juries-to enforce English revenue laws. ° Such
executive manipulation is precisely what the Declaration of Independence
decried in complaining that
King George III was "depriving us... of the
31
benefits of trial by jury."
From the genesis of the U.S. system, the jury has served as the primary
means of protecting individuals from being unjustly imprisoned or
executed. The FederalFanner,Anti-Federalist writings published at the
time of The FederalistPapers,asserted that the people secured through the
'
jury "their just and rightful control in the judicial department."3 12
The
FederalFarmeralso asserted that the jury "enables them [the jurors] to
acquire information and knowledge in the affairs and government of the
society; and to come forward, in turn, as sentinels and guardians of each
other."3 3' Another Anti-Federalist writing called the jury the "democratic
lower branch of the judiciary power."3'14 A recent decision by the U.S.
Supreme Court echoed the words of the FederalFannerand reiterated that
the jury serves as an important check on the government.3" 5
In the Anglo-American tradition, therefore, persons of all political
stripes have agreed on at least one thing: the jury system serves justice by
allowing average citizens to serve as a check within the broader scheme
of governmental checks and balances. This broad support-based on the
intuitive awareness that the jury serves a crucial role in administering
justice-derives from the fact that the jury system is actually tapping into
a number of transcendent principles.3 16 A deeper exploration of those
principles is thus in order.

309.
310.
311.
312.
(Herbert

Alschuler & Deiss, supranote 303, at 873.
Id.
Id.at 875.
Letters from Federal Farmer XV, reprintedin 2 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 320
J. Storing ed., 1981).

313. Id.

314. Essays by a Farmer IV, reprintedin 5 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 38 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981).
315. See Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004) (citing FederalFarmer and
emphasizing the jury's role as a check on the judicial branch contemplated by the Framers).
316. See supranotes 294-315 and accompanying text; infra notes 316-362 and accompanying
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2. Principles Underlying the Jury as Part of Governmental
Checks and Balances
The Framers were not only well versed in English law-they knew
both the truths revealed in Scripture and their own experience of human
nature.31 7 In this respect, John Calvin significantly influenced the Framers'
perspective. 8 Likewise, the political theorist who most influenced the
Framers-Baron de Montesquieu 3 9-shared a keen awareness of the
vulnerabilities of human nature. In the opening to The Spirit of Laws,
Montesquieu states:
Man, as a physical being... incessessantly transgresses the laws
established by God, and changes those of his own instituting. He is
left to his private direction, though a limited being, like all finite
intelligences, to ignorance and error; even his imperfect knowledge
he loses; and a sensible creature he is hurried away by a thousand
impetuous passions.32°
Although Calvin and Montesquieu held a stark view of human nature,
the two thinkers shared the hope that properly devised institutions could
offset the effects of the vulnerability of human nature to bias, prejudice,
and self-interest.32 ' At the Philadelphia Convention, the Founding Fathers
examined each institution with the assumption that it could be corrupted,
but carried a "steadfast, if wary, optimism that they might craft a
governmental structure that would preserve liberty."3'22 They knew the
weaknesses of a monarchy, having experienced them first-hand under
King George 11.323 They also, however, knew all too well the limitations
of a democracy lacking institutional leadership, such as that which existed
under the Articles of Confederation.324 Hence, the Framers developed a
republican form of government, with defined institutional limits and
317.

JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING

FATHERS 20-21 (1995).
318. Id. at 18-20; Marci A Hamilton, The Calvinist Paradoxof Distrust and Hope at the
ConstitutionalConvention, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGALTHOUGHT293, 295-96 (Michael
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Hamilton, CalvinistParadox].

319. Charles Louis Joseph de Secondat, the Baron Montesquieu of France (1689-1755), whose
Spirit of Laws was the source most cited by the Framers other than the Bible. See Lutz, supranote
294, at 189-97.
320. 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 3 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed. 1991).
321. Hamilton, CalvinistParadox,supra note 318, at 296, 303-04; 11 MONTESQUIEu THE
SPIRIT OF LAWS ch. 6 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed. 1991).
322. Hamilton, Calvinist Paradox,supra note 318, at 297-98.
323. RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 395 (2004).
324. Id.at418
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delegated powers, and an intricate series of checks and balances
designed
325
to minimize the effects of human frailties and self-interest.
The institutions most often identified as providing constitutional checks
are the Judiciary, the Congress, and the President. Yet the People represent
another important check within the system. The People may, of course,
serve as a check by speaking at the polls, by exercising their right to free
speech, and by other means. A more subtle way in which the People may
actually become part of the governmental system is through service on a
jury. The jury represents one of the checks on the judicial power in which
average laypersons can actively participate.326
The jury is the favored Anglo-American procedural mechanism for
limiting the vulnerabilities of human nature to bias, prejudice, and selfinterest in the judicial system. In other words, it is the mechanism
traditionally favored in England and America to promote impartial
decision-making. This root desire for impartiality in the judicial process
is universal. 327 It is a central tenet of Christianity.32 8 In Leviticus, for
instance, the Torah states: "Do not pervert justice, do not show partiality
to the poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor fairly."'3 29
And in Deuteronomy we again hear the same injunction: "And I charged
your judges at that time: Hear the disputes between your brothers and
judge fairly, whether the case is between brother Israelites or between one
of them and an alien. Do not show partiality in judging: hear both small
and great alike."33 Scripture elsewhere explains that human judges, in
doing their job, are emulating the divine judge:
Consider carefully what you do, because you are not judging for
man but for the Lord, who is with you whenever you give a verdict.
Now let the fear of the Lord be upon you. Judge carefully, for with
the Lord our God there is no injustice or partiality or bribery.3 3 '
This insistence of impartiality as the sine qua non of a judicial system is
a tenet not only of Christianity but also of other leading world religions.332
325. Seeid. at 415-39.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 312-15.
327. See generally THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 1982);
Allen N. Sultan, JudicialAutonomy UnderInternationalLaw, 21 U. DAYTON L. REv. 585 (1996).
328. See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1807 (1994) (equating justice with
impartial judging, among other things).
329. Leviticus 19:15 (NIV).
330. Deuteronomy 1:16-17 (NIV).
331. 2 Chronicles 19:6-7.
332. See authorities cited supra note 327.
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As Calvin, Montesquieu, and the Framers recognized, the problem in
achieving the principle of impartial decision-making arises from the nature
of mankind. Human nature is imperfect and, as a result, we must have
checks on individual decision-makers to avoid the bias and prejudice that
impede justice.333 James Madison, the architect of the intricate system of
checks and balances in the Constitution, put it best in FederalistNo. 51:
But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on
human nature? If men were angels, no government would be
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controuls on government would be necessary. In framing
a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to
controul the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to controul
itself...
One could argue that adding together a number of individuals carries
the risk of multiplying human frailties as opposed to limiting them.33 5 Such
an argument is unpersuasive, however, because it rests on an overly
pessimistic view of human nature. Every person has flaws, but their moral
compass helps in sorting out right and wrong. Aristotle conceived of a
sense of natural justice within each person that, though imperfect, helped
the person toward virtue.3 36 The natural law tradition, perhaps best stated
by Thomas Aquinas, contemplates this inherent ability to move toward
truth as "right reason."33' 7 Great legal minds like Coke and Blackstone
reiterated the principal that all persons, though limited by human
vulnerabilities, have the inherent capacity through "right reason"
(conscience) to get to the true or just answer to a human situation.338 By
333. See generally Benjamin V. Madison, III, RICO, Judicial Activism, and the Roots of
Separation of Powers, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 29 (2005).
334. THE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
335. See generally Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial, in Is HIGHER LAW COMMON LAW? 185
(Jeffrey A Brauch ed., 1999).
336. ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Book V, § 7 (William David Ross trans.,
Oxford University Press 1998).
337. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Quest.91, Art. 4 (Fathers of English Dominican
Province trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1952) (1273).
338. See, e.g., HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, Ch. IV

(1990) ("For ajust man has the will of awarding to each his right, and so his will is termed justice,
and it is said to be the will to award each his right, not as regards the result, but as regards the
intention .. ");
1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book I(1765-1769)
(mankind created "and endued... [with] certain immutable laws of human nature, whereby...
freewill is in some degree regulated and restrained, and gave [mankind] also the faculty of reason
to discover the purport of those laws").
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bringing together a number of moral compasses, one in each jury member,
a jury is more likely to get to a correct or just result by having several
moral compasses at work on a problem (the case). If one person's moral
compass is weak due to greater human vulnerability (or perhaps even a life
crisis distracting that person), the other jury members' moral compasses
may work to offset that individual's weakness.
Nevertheless, no one should hold out the jury as a perfect means of
limiting the biases and prejudices of human beings. At the least, the jury
serves as one means of seeking the goal of providing a check within the
judicial system on such prejudices. Madison refers not only to
"dependence on the People," but also to "auxiliary precautions" as being
essential to controlling government.139 He then explains more fully the
rationale behind such auxiliary precautions:
This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect
of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of
human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly
displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power; where the
constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a
manner as that each may be a check on the other; that the private
interest 0of every individual, may be a Sentinel over the public
34
rights.
The jury certainly fits within this concept of a check on other branches of
government, especially on judges (appointed by the executive in the
federal system) in criminal matters. The lesson of centuries of English
experience was that the jury filled this role well.3 4' Thus, whether a jury
as a whole checks the vulnerabilities of the individual members of the
jury, experience suggests that the jury at least serves as a check on judges.
In the Anglo-American system, the jury has proven to be the favorite
method of limiting the effect of human bias and prejudice in decisionmaking.3 42 Nevertheless, the jury is not the sole procedural approach to
this problem. As the next section shows, many sophisticated legal systems
have developed alternative means of minimizing human prejudice and
self-interest and promoting impartial decision-making.

339. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books 1992).

340. Id. at 263.
341. See supra notes 294-315 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 294-315 and accompanying text.
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3. Alternative Procedural Approaches to Ensuring Impartiality in
Decision-Making
Comparative law scholars highlight the differences between AngloAmerican and continental legal systems. Nevertheless, each system seeks
the same goal of impartial decision-making through systemic protections.
The common law system relies heavily on the lay jury. Other judicial
systems throughout history have found the jury to be an effective method
of promoting impartiality. 34 3 Nevertheless, the civil law tradition followed
in many European countries takes a different approach while including
mechanisms to mediate between the prosecuting government and the
individual accused. 3 "
In the civil law tradition, different procedural safeguards exist with the
same goal as the Anglo-American jury: creating a buffer between the
accusing state and the individual accused. 345 The civil law tradition offers
no lay jury, or even a specific day dedicated to hearing all the evidence.
Rather, the parties hold a series of conferences with the judge to present
the evidence and for the judge to decide the merits of the case. 3 ' Although
this is analogous to an American or English bench trial, there are
differences. In civil law countries, the judge plays a more active role in
evidence gathering, instead of being merely a referee or umpire as in the
United States. 347 For example, in Germany, the trial judge determines the
order of proof, examines the witnesses, creates the record of testimony,

343. In Athens, citizens were chosen by lot to sit in judgment over civil or criminal matters.
LESSER, supra note 54, at 21. Known as dikasts and sitting as a dikastery, they were a "simple and
plenary manifestation ofa jury trial.... They insured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded,
and imposing-together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violence on
the part of the rich and the great." Id. In Athens, the plaintiff went before the magistrate to issue
a summons for the defendant to appear. Id. at 24. Following the summons, the magistrate held a
preliminary hearing to determine whether plaintiff had made a prima facie case. If he had, then
depositions were taken before the magistrate. The dikastery heard the evidence again and cast their
verdict. Id. Because of the small size of the Athenian state, "many of these who sat as dikasts must
have been cognizant beforehand of the facts of the case.., in this respect [the diskastery] bears a
striking resemblance to the English jury in olden times." Id. at 25-26. The Roman criminal system
also provided a trial by jury. LESSER, supra note 54, at 41. "Every criminal trial was ... conducted
before a legal magistrate and a body ofjudices, or, in modem phrase, before a judge and jury." Id
The magistrate, like the modem judge, was the authority on the law and managed the trial, but the
judices determined the guilt or innocence of the accused. Id.
344. As explored below, the United States has developed its own alternative to the lay jury in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See infra text accompanying notes 494-559.
345. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and FunctionalAspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals,48 ALA. L. REv. 441,457 (1997).
346. See id,
347. Id. at 458.

TRIAL BYJURY OR BY MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR ACCUSED TERRORIST DETAINEES

and secures expert witnesses.348 In France, the presiding judge calls the
witnesses.349 Under the former Italian "Rocco" Code of 1930, a presiding
judge at an instruzioneformale(formal investigation) assembled evidence
both for and against the accused. 35" The Italian preliminary hearing is
meant to be nonpartisan; in some ways, it is akin to the grand jury in the
" ' The Italian system thus erects a barrier between
common law tradition.35
the state and the individual such as Blackstone documented in England,
but the barrier is built differently.35 2 Instead of a body of citizens drawn
from the local community, a nonpartisan judge, during a preliminary
hearing, decides whether to proceed against the accused or dismiss the
charges for lack of evidence.353
The civil law tradition also differs from the common law tradition in
the composition of a court.354 Nevertheless, a court in civil law countries
provides a safeguard similar to that of a common law jury. Cases in the
civil law tradition are often tried by a "mixed court" where both
professional and lay judges sit.355 In Germany, lay judges sit on courts for
specialized labor, social, commercial, administrative, and tax courts.356
They are also used for cases of serious crimes.35 7 German lay judges
participate in discussing issues of both law and fact, unlike common law
juries that sit only as triers-of-fact. 35" Furthermore, lay judges tend to be
more experienced than common law jurors for two reasons. First, lay
judges sitting on specialized courts are chosen from the industry.359
Second, lay judges sit for four years and hear many cases and thus become
knowledgeable in trial procedure.360
In short, a variety of procedural systems have developed, even in
countries predominantly influenced by the Christian tradition.3 6' Although
the jury system has proved to be the paramount means of achieving
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See Elisabetta Grande, Italian CriminalJustice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J.
COMP. L. 227, 229 (2000).
351. See id.
352. See id.
353. Id.
354. See id.
355. Smith, supra note 345, at 461.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 467.
359. Id. at 462.
360. Smith, supra note 345, at 462; see also John H. Langbein, Mixed Court andJury Court:
Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195
(1981).
361. See supratext accompanying notes 343-60; infra text accompanying note 362.
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impartial decision-making in the Anglo-American system, other systems
have developed mechanisms to approximate the effect of the jury. Indeed,
even in the American justice system, such alternative methods have been
developed where the traditional jury is not available.362
B. TranscendentPrinciples Underlying the President'sPower to Order
Trial by Military Tribunals
The immediately preceding section offers insight into the values
underlying the individual rights typically associated with a jury but
achieved in alternate ways in various justice systems. This section turns to
the collective rights and powers exercised in times of serious threats to
national security. These include a host of items categorized under the
broad umbrella known as "war powers." The trial and punishment of
persons captured in military engagements falls within the government's
war powers.
Implicit within the concept of war powers is that they are not the
norm.363 If no threat to national security existed, the government would not
have these exceptional powers.3 ' For persons to be tried by military
tribunals as "unlawful combatants," as the term suggests, they will have
somehow taken steps to threaten national security--either by active
fighting or by espionage.365 In other words, the broader justification
supporting the military action will be implicit in any scenario giving rise
to a military tribunal proceeding. Accordingly, examination of the
justifications for permitting the government to engage in military actions
in the first place is necessary. The rationale of any such justifications
should likewise provide the foundational framework supporting trials by
military tribunal, along with the other incidents of war such as detention
of prisoners, heightened security measures, and the like.
For any discussion of the rationale for the government's military
actions, consideration ofjust war doctrine is a logical starting point. After
all, this doctrine has for centuries served as the theological and
philosophical foundation of war powers.36 6 The Framers were undoubtedly

362. Primarily, this refers to the Uniform Code of Military Justice in which a variety of
protections promote impartial justice, though without a jury. See infra text accompanying notes
494-559.
363. See generallyHenry P. Monaghan, PresidentialWar-Making,50 B.U. L. Rev. 19 (1970).
364. See id,
365. See, e.g., Michael 0. Lacey, MilitaryCommissions:A HistoricalPerspective,2002 ARMY
LAW. 41, 45.

366. Id.
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aware of the doctrine, at least through political theorists such as John
Locke.367
1. Synopsis of Just War Doctrine
Philosophers have long argued that war can be just.3 68 Just war theory
provides an ethical framework for determining when it is just to wage war
and for the constraints of conducting the war.3 69 Christian theologian and
philosopher St. Augustine is largely regarded as the originator of the just
war theory.37 ° He relied on the Bible to persuade the Christian community
that war can be just.37 ' Augustine wrote:
It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even
by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in
command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end
sought for by war.... For even they who intentionally interrupt the
peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace, but only
wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. They do not,
therefore, wish to have no peace, but only one more to their
mind.372

In some cases, Augustine thought war was not only just, but virtuous.3 73
When war is fought to replace evil with good, war is commendable.374
Centuries later, Thomas Aquinas echoed Augustine's work and
clarified much of the just war doctrine. As with most subjects on which he
wrote, Aquinas relied as much on natural law-that law revealed in the
nature of the created order, as determined by reason-as scriptures.375
367. See, e.g.,

JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS

IN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 147 (2002).

368. Aristotle said: "We make war so we can live in peace." 10 ARISTOTLE, THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, ch. 7 (David Ross trans., Oxford University Press rev. ed. 1984).
369. MICHAEL M. UHLMANN, THE USE AND ABUSE OF JUST-WAR THEORY 10 (2003).
370. R.A. McCormick, Morality of War, in 14 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 802, 803

(1967). For more than three centuries, the Christian church was essentially pacifistic, before the
influence of Ambrose, Augustine's mentor, and even more significantly, Augustine himself See
generally G. NUTTALL, CHRISTIAN PACIFISM IN HISTORY (1971).
371. See, e.g., Luke 3:14 (NIV) (ordering soldiers to be content with their pay, not to stop
soldiering).
372. 19 SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, ch. 12, at 425 (Marcus Dods trans., Modem
Library ed., Random House 1993).
373. Id.
374. Id. BOOK IV, ch. 14, at 123.
375. See, e.g., CHARLES RICE, 50 QUESTIONS ON NATURAL LAW 39-40, 49-56 (1999) (on
Aquinas's use ofnatural law and scriptures). SeeTHOMASAQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLODGICA, pt. 11-11,
question 40, art. 1(The Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Brothers 1947)

402
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Under what is known as the first prong of the just war theory, "jus ad
bellum," Aquinas identified three criteria necessary for war to be justly
undertaken. First, war must be waged by a sovereign authority.3 76 It is the
the sovereign, the authority in charge, to care for the
responsibility of377
"common good." ' The sovereign has the moral authority to punish evildoers who threaten internal disturbances, and the moral authority to wage
war to protect the common good from external enemies.37 Aquinas relied
on St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans as evidence of his belief that only
public authority can exercise force for the good of the community.3 79
Aquinas agreed with Augustine that "[t]he natural order conducive to
peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war
should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."38
Second, Aquinas said, a reason for the attack must exist based on a
fault of the external enemy.3"' According to Aquinas, ajust war is one that
"avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing
to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what
'
Sufficient reasons include self-defense,
it has seized unjustly."382
punishment for wrongdoing, and the need to save others.383 Third, in order
for war to be just it must be waged with a just intention. 3" An example of
a just intention is protecting the common good against evil.385 The
intention of going to war should be to gain peace. 6
Thus, Aquinas and Augustine agree that war is justifiable when waged
by a sovereign authority for the common good against a deserving enemy
for the purposes of protecting peace. Their work provided the foundation
for later scholars to form modern-day international law concerning war.387
For instance, Francisco Suarez and Francisco de Vitoria added two
additional requirements to a non-defensive war (a war waged on a basis
(1273) (relying not only on scripture to support his position that war may be lawful but also on
natural law concepts such as "natural order" in the section introduced by "I answer that" (formally
called "Respondeo dicens") where Aquinas gives his own position and in his Reply to Objection
2 (where Aquinas relies on the common good, is inherently a natural law concept)).
376. AQUINAS, supra note 375, pt. II-I, question 40, art. 1.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. See Romans 13:1-6 (NIV).
380. AQUINAS, supra note 375, pt. II, question 40, art. 1.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 502.
385. AQUINAS, supra note 375, pt. II, question 40, art. 1, at 502.
386. Id. at 502.
387. See, e.g., Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 125, 132 (1997).
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other than purely self-defense). They argued that the military action must
be of last resort and it must be fought in a proportionate manner.3"' This
proportionality requirement became known as the second prong of the just
' Thus, the just war doctrine evolved into a
war theory, "jus in bello."389
framework for waging war (jus ad bellum) and for the manner in which
war must be conducted (jus in bello).3 9 °
Jus in bello, the second category of just war principles, came to focus
on two aspects: proportionality and discrimination. Proportionality
weighed the total evil against the total good.39 ' A proportional response is
one that does not involve excessive force; force cannot be used in excess
of what is needed to accomplish the goal.392 For instance, weapons of mass
destruction are generally thought to be outside the levels of proportionality
when dealing with war.393 Discrimination means war must be waged in a
selective manner, most notably by distinguishing between enemy
combatants and non-combatants. 394 The chief focus of this element is to
emphasize that a government should not attack
civilians. 395 Hostilities
39
only.
combatants
should be advanced against
Hugo Grotius, considered by some to be the father of international law,
referred to war as a necessary evil and identified criteria for a just war that
addressed both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.397 His work led to
international law incorporating these principles. For instance, we need
look no further than Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (recognizing
the right of a nation to use force for self-defense)398 for a modem
388. McCormick, supra note 370, at 803.
389. See id.
390. See id.
391.

JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 203 (1981)

(reiterating Vitoria's analysis that proportionality to subdue the enemy is weighed under the jus ad
bellum notion instead of the jus in bello).
392. See id.
393. See id.
394. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD GUELFF, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 1, 14 (2000).
395. JOHNSON, supra note 391, at 299-303 (creating classes of "enemy" as combatant and
noncombatant and thus protecting the latter class from attack).
396. Id.
397. See 2 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, ch. 1 (Liberty Fund ed. 1984)
(1625).
398. Article 51 U.N. Charter provides as follows:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
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codification of the jus ad bellum prong.3 In addition, Protocol I of the
Geneva Convention (prohibiting certain military actions) 400 conforms to
the principle of discrimination and may be traced directly to the work of
Grotius.4 ° '
2. The Common Good as the Root of Just War Doctrine and Appointed
Authority's Role in Balancing Interests
The just war doctrine rests on the notion that the best interests of
everyone in a society depend at times on use of force.40 2 The concept relies
heavily on the sometimes amorphous, but nevertheless crucial, concept of
the "common good." Who bears the all-important job of balancing these
interests and making decisions that sacrifice some interests in favor of the
ultimate security of the state? The answer depends on the kind of
government-the appointed authority-that the state in question has
adopted. For purposes of simplicity, the governing authority will be
referred to here as "authority."
In order to appreciate the significance of the role of the "common
good," one must review the development of the doctrine and understand
the role of authority in securing the common good.

under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51, availableat http://www.un.org/ aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm.
399. See id.
400. Article 51, para. 4 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949 (adopted June 8, 1977, entry into force December 7, 1979) provides:
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed
at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are
of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 3, 16 I.L.M.
1391.
401. See 3 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OFWARAND PEACE, ch. 13 (Gryphon Editions 1984)

(1625).
402. See supra notes 368-96 and accompanying text.
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a. Evolution of "Common Good" Doctrine
The concept of the common good dates back to Ancient Greece and
Rome when Aristotle expressed his concern with the "transformation of
a community of people working together for a common good (the family)
into a community of people self-consciously working together for a
common good (a political community)." ' 3 Aristotle discussed the
common good as it pertains to a partnership in a good life." This
partnership involves the individuals5 supporting each other in a variety of
40
ways so as to form a community.
Over a hundred years later, Cicero echoed Aristotle's thoughts in
speaking of the "partnership for the common good" and of reconciling
factional interests for the common good.4"6 Augustine built on the classical
tradition in explicating the concept of the common good. Augustine, for
instance, observed that people "should be bound together by a kind of tie
of kinship to form a harmonious unity, linked together by the 'bond of
peace."" 7
Later, the concept of common good dominated much of the
philosophical writings of Aquinas. His interpretation of law was that
which regards "first and foremost the order to the common good." ' 8 Like
Aristotle, Aquinas understood the common good as involving partnership
in a good life.' ° As Aquinas noted:
As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of
the state: and the state is a perfect community... and therefore, as
the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the
common good; so too the good of one household is ordained to the
good of a single state, which is a perfect community."0
b. Role of Authority in Securing the Common Good
If the common good of a state is the goal, one must ask who within the
state determines what course best achieves that goal in any set of
circumstances. Aristotle, and later Aquinas, referred to the proper
403.

MICHAEL DAVIS, THE POLITICS OF PHILOSOPHY: A COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S

POLITICS (1996).
404. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 336, Book VIII.
405. See J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WRITrEN ON THE HEART: THE CASE FOR NATURAL LAW 18 (1997).
406. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA DE LEGIBUS 65 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans., Harvard
University Press 1928) (54 B.C.).
407. AUGUSTINE, supra note 372, at 547.

408. AQUINAS, supra note 375, pt. II-II, question 94, art. 1.
409. See id.
410. Id.
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"authority" within a state as the one who determines the course designed
to achieve the common good."' Yves Simon, a philosopher who explored
the implications of Aquinas's teachings, devoted a great deal of his
thought to the proper role of authority in achieving the common good." 2
The common good, Simon explained, must have a unity of action which
"cannot be taken for granted; it must be caused."" 3 First, Simon states that
"[o]nly the union of many can remedy the failure of each."4 4 Quoting
Aristotle, Simon wrote:
"The common good is greater and more divine than the private
good." "Greater" expresses a higher degree of perfection with
regard both to duration and to diversity. "Divine". . . does not
designate so much a godlike essence as a participation in the
privilege of imperishability. In this world of change, individuals
come and go ....The masterpiece of the natural world cannot be
found in the transient individual. Nor can it be found in the species,
which is not imperishable ....
Human communities are the highest
attainment of nature, for they are virtually unlimited with regard to
the diversity of perfections, and virtually immortal. Beyond the
satisfaction of individual needs the association of men serves a
good unique in plentitude and duration, the common good of the
community. 5
Simon maintained that to achieve this common good and unity of
action, "the power in charge of unifying common action through rules
binding for all is what everyone calls authority.""'6 One modem scholar
summed up the concept as follows:
[A]uthority, though often abused and always characterized by
human faults, is a natural and moral good. It does not result solely
from human sinfulness (to restrain the worst in us). It springs from
human virtue and human need. Authority is needed, for example,
not only to secure individual rights, but also to give effective unity

411. See id.
412. YvEs SIMoN, A GENERAL THEORY OF AUTHORrrY 32 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1980)
(1962).
413. Seeid. at32.
414. Id.at 28.
415. Id. at 28-29 (explaining Aristotle's statement that the common good is greater than the
private good).
416. Id. at48.

2006]
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in the pursuit of common purposes as are mentioned in the
preamble to the U.S. Constitution.417
Both the common good and authority are essential to an ordered
society. Aquinas held that the common good ultimately is the fulfillment
of each of its citizens, and that government and the law should therefore
promote that fulfillment.418 In American government, the government's
war powers are consistent with the very foundations of the common
good.419 Under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the executive power is
vested in the President of the United States.42 As "Commander-in-chief
of the Army and Navy of the United States,""42 the President has broad
powers in protecting the nation. Such powers include the power to conduct
a war, although only Congress may declare war.422 Supreme Court
decisions have acknowledged that the potential limits of this power are
broad indeed.42 3 It is clear that the executive is within the concept of
"proper authority" as Aristotle and Aquinas conceived of the concept.424
The more subtle point is that authority, in American government, is
shared. As explained above,425 the U.S. Constitution delegates war powers
to both the President and to Congress. Thus, authority cannot be neatly
ascribed solely to the President. Indeed, although circumstances may
require the decisive action that only the executive branch could provide,
the President's authority is harder to defend when exercised solely on the
executive's powers.426 Did the Framers carefully provide for shared
powers in this arena due to their keen awareness of the danger to
individual liberties of a powerful executive? As the final section of this
Article explains, Congress has a significant role in the realm of national
security to ensure that the government achieves a proper balance between
417. MICHAEL NOVAK, FREE PERSONS AND THE COMMON GOOD 184 (1989).
418. JOHN FINNIS, NATuRAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 222 (1980).
419. SeegenerallyJEANB. ELSHTAIN, JUSTWARAGAINSTTERROR46-70 (2003) (arguing that

using armed force is an appropriate means to serve the general welfare).
420. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
421. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
422. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
423. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,320(1936) (dicta indicating
that the powers of the President "as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations" rose not from a constitutional grant but cessation of sovereignty by Great
Britain and the immediate assumption of power by the colonies collectively); see also Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,686 (1981) (holding that the President's power from a congressional
authorization to seize assets and terminate all private litigation and claims in favor of a specially
established tribunal was constitutional).
424. See supratext accompanying notes 411-15.
425. See supratext accompanying notes 94-97, 419-23.
426. See supratext accompanying notes 211-15.
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protecting national security and securing fundamental human rights.
Before turning to that final section, however, it is important to revisit the
question of whether the persons accused in the military tribunal
proceedings can insist on any human rights. If illegal combatants
somehow forfeit these most fundamental of rights, then the need for
balancing does not exist. If, however, the accused's status as a human
being means that he cannot forfeit certain rights, then the balancing
process is a crucial one.
3. Whether Illegal Combatants Forfeits are Entitled to Fundamental
Human Rights
Some contend that the illegal combatants are entitled to no rights at
all.427 By engaging in conduct against the laws of armed conflict, so this
argument goes, the person forfeits rights that he or she would have under
international law. In engaging this argument, it is critical to distinguish
what is meant by "international law."
Grotius and other fathers of modem international law recognized
different types of international law. Certain international law arises from
treaties between sovereigns.428 Other international law, however, derives
from the natural law.4 29 This latter type of law is an immutable law that no
nation can change. 43 0 It is the law Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas
recognized as principles that are part of the God-given order of the
universe. This distinction between treaties, or conventions, and immutable
natural laws is crucial. Courts and commentators are correct in observing
that persons who engage in war without, for instance, satisfying the
required criteria specified in the Third Geneva Convention cannot claim
the protections of that convention. 43' Nevertheless, these persons always
can appeal to immutable natural laws.
Grotius's treatment of pirates offers an excellent example of this
distinction. Grotius explains that pirates, by not associating with a
legitimate nation state, cannot be categorized neatly as an "enemy" for

427. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules oJ War Can'tProtectAl Qaeda,N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31,2001, at Al 1 (claiming that members of al-Qaeda are unprivileged combatants who do not have
a right to "claim protection of the law").
428. See 2 HuGo GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, ch. 15 (Liberty Fund ed. 2005)
(1625).
429. The primary roots of the just war theory developed by Grotius in Book I of the Rights of
War and Peace are in natural law, immutable principles that exist regardless of treaties between
nation-states. See id. Book I (discussing just war principles).
430. See id.
431. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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purposes of determining the treatment owed to them.432 As Grotius
explains: "Indeed such Sort of People have not with others that particular
Community, which the Law of Nations hath introduced between Enemies
engaged in a solemn and compleat War. But yet, as Men, they are to enjoy
the common Benefits of the Law of Nature .... 4"
The notion that all men have certain "inherent" or "inalienable" rights
is of course one recognized by America's Founding Fathers.434 The
principle was first expressed in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, drafted
before the Declaration of Independence.435 The notion that every human
being has certain basic rights "endowed by their Creator" was perhaps best
expressed in the U.S. Declaration of Independence.436 More recently, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, echoing Grotius's
recognition that even pirates are "men," acknowledges in its preamble
"that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person.""
This Covenant, widely adopted by a growing number of signatories, 4
recognizes in its substantive provisions the dignity owed by states to all
human beings, even when the states are seeking to enforce their laws.43 9
Although persons can waive certain rights, these principles establish that
human beings cannot forfeit their inalienable rights to life and liberty.
V. EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT BY EVALUATING THE
PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The above sections have described transcendent principles underlying
both the right to a jury trial and the government's power to conduct
military tribunals. One subject that merits further exploration is the extent
to which common principles underlie both sets of rights. This section
begins with that exploration. The section continues by considering whether
the current military tribunal structure fails to provide sufficient checks to
432. See 2 GROTIhS, supra note 428, ch. III.
433. Id. Book III, ch. XIX.
434. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
435. Final Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, preface (June 12, 1776), in 1 ROBERT
RUTLAND, THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 287 (1970) (1776).
436. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
437. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, pmbl., 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 173 [hereinafter ICCPR].

438. See Office of the United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights, Status of Ratification:
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccprratify.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
439. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 437, at 176 ("All persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.").
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promote impartial decision-making, especially where the death penalty is
available. The section also addresses the role that Congress should play in
achieving a system that balances the competing interests in a manner more
consistent with the common good.
A. Exploring the Extent to Which Common Principlesand Ideals
Underlie Both the Individual's Right to an ImpartialDecision-Maker
and the Government's War Powers, Including that of Trying Persons by
Military Tribunal
Does the individual's right to an impartial decision-maker have
implications for everyone in the state? If so, we may say that it affects the
common good. Likewise, anything related to war powers, if supported by
just war doctrine, will also relate to the common good. Thus, the two sets
of rights here-one viewed primarily as individual but having broader
implications, and the other viewed by nature as collective--overlap in
some sense. The Framers referred to the "General Welfare," and seemed
to recognize that the concept would require a recalibration as
circumstances change."' This section revisits the concept of the common
good to see whether it helps to better elucidate the constitutional conflict
presented here.
Although he carried the discussion of the common good quite far,
Aquinas left to others the job of working out the tension between the rights
of the individual and the rights of the state. In the twentieth century,
philosopher Jacques Maritain brought the concept of the common good in
step with the development of modem nation-states." ' While appreciating
the Aristotelian and Thomistic teachings on common good, Maritain
integrated those teachings with concepts of individual human rights." 2
Maritain participated in developing the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and was an astute observer of the social problems of his time." 3 He
maintained that the rights of the society must reflect individual rights
because the interests of both society and the individual are strongly

440. Cf. Alvin L. Goldman, Resorting to External Norms and Principles in Constitutional
Decision-Making,92 Ky. L.J. 703, 766 (2003-04) (arguing that the general welfare clause needs
to be used more to ensure that the purposes of the Constitution are honored).
441. JACQUES MARrTAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD (John J. Fitzgerald trans.,
1947).
442. See id.
443. The report, questionnaire, and collected responses of the U.N. Committee charged with
drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are collected in JACQUES MARITAIN, HUMAN
RIGHTS: COMMENTS AND INTERPRETATIONS (1949).
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intertwined.' " Their interests are not in conflict because they affect each
other: what affects the individual affects the community and vice versa.
The innovation in the American scheme of government was to seek the
common good-referred to as the "General Welfare" 4 "-while also
protecting individual liberties.' To achieve this goal, James Madison:
sought to check the less than honorable (or even honorable, but
one-sided) instincts of free persons in order to protect the public
good. And he also sought to check public power, so as to protect
private rights. For him, these two are not irreconcilable. On the
contrary, private rights are an indispensable component of the
public good." 7
Among individual liberties, the right to a jury trial perhaps best illustrates
the interrelationship of individual rights and the common good. As
explained above, this right developed as a protection of individuals against
a powerful executive."' Fully aware of English history and their own
experience of the abuse of power at the hands of King George III, the
Framers keenly appreciated the need to protect persons from the executive.
An individual accused of a crime, immediately benefits from the right to
a jury trial.
The Framers, moreover, saw fit to conceive of this right as one that
every individual-regardless of citizenship-should enjoy." 9 The right is
guaranteed to an "accused," not just to citizens.45 ° As explained earlier, the
U.S. Supreme Court correctly interpreted this constitutional language to
mean that all persons accused of a serious crime have the right to a jury
" ' If any person is tried, convicted, and sentenced for a serious crime
trial.45
in a system that lacks procedures to protect against bias and prejudice, the
common good suffers. In some incremental way, perhaps not appreciated
at the moment but inevitably felt in the long term, the general welfare is
diminished in such cases.
444. MARTAIN, supra note 441, at 19. Likewise, contemporary English philosopher John
Finnis defines the natural law concept of the "common good" as "a set of conditions which enables
the members of the community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize
reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with
each other... in a community." FINNIS, supra note 418, at 155.

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

See U.S. CONST. pmbl.
NOVAK, supra note 417, at 43.
Id. at 51.
See supratext accompanying notes
See supratext accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes
See supra text accompanying notes

294-311.
445-48.
445-48.
33-39.
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A dilemma arises, however, when one introduces national security
threats into the equation. Systems and practices that serve the common
good in times of peace may have to be altered or abandoned. The rationale
for the change hinges on an altered conception of the common good.
Indeed, the U.S. Constitution's preamble highlights the inextricable link
between national security and the general welfare:
We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.452
Having thus explored the transcendent principles underlying ajury trial
and underlying the power to try persons by military tribunal, the remainder
of this Article analyzes the difficult question of whether these principles
can be reconciled. In other words, the remainder of this Article will
discuss whether the collective rights, represented by the government
exercising its war powers, can be honored while still accommodating the
principle underlying the right to jury trial, even if in a different form.
B. Whether the CurrentMilitary TribunalSystem Already Properly
Balances the Interests at Stake
In the military tribunal system enacted by the Military Commission Act
of 2006, Congress has attempted to strike a balance that serves the
common good.4 53 The procedures in the Act allow for efficiently
streamlining the judicial process and protecting classified information and
sources.454 The host of problems the government encountered in
prosecuting alleged terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui illustrates the problem
of using the civilian criminal justice system to prosecute enemy
combatants.455 In the civilian criminal justice system, all trials are
presumed to be open "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in
findings. 456 By contrast, the presumption in prosecutions conducted by
military tribunals is that the proceedings are closed but that the tribunal
452. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
453. S. 3980, 109th Cong. (2006).
454. See id.§§ 948q-948s, 949a-949o.
455. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of
some of the problems presented by prosecuting Moussaoui in the civilian criminal justice system,
see A. John Rasdan, The Moussaoui Case: The Messfrom Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1417 (2005).
456. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980).
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may, in its discretion, open parts of the proceedings in which the tribunal
determines no risk of compromising classified information or sources.4 57
Military tribunals thus serve the interest of protecting national security,
but do they also provide a system that ensures a just result? Although the
military tribunal procedures as currently promulgated achieve admirable
systemic protections of accused,458 they lack one essential component:
independent and impartial decision-makers. The current military tribunal
procedures lack any systemic protections to eliminate bias and prejudice
in the decision-making process. As explained below, they offer at best a
symbolic buffer between the executive as prosecutor and the executive as
judge.
The composition of each military tribunal includes only commissioned
military officers.45 9 Representatives of the executive branch are thus not
only bringing the charges but also prosecuting the accused even in cases
involving the death penalty.46 Those charged with determining the guilt
of the accused and appropriateness of the death penalty are employed by,
and answer to, the executive. The Magna Carta,and the evolution of the
lay jury in the common law system, arose to prevent exactly this
dangerous scenario." In civil code systems, other protections arose to
prevent unchecked influence between the prosecuting authority and the
judges." 2 Even in trials of U.S. armed forces members, the Uniform Code
of Military Justice provides some buffers between the prosecuting
authorities and the judges." 3
This is not to say that the military officers serving on the tribunals lack
integrity, or that the executive branch has less than admirable ulterior
motives. Simply put, the executive should not be expected to intervene and
ensure that the proper balance of transcendent values is honored. One of
457. See generally Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1962
(2005).
458. See Military Commission Act of 2006, S. 3980, 109th Cong. § 948k (2006) (requiring
well qualified defense counsel); id. § 9481 (providing for reporters and interpreters); id. § 948q
(requiring charging documents); id. § 948r (prohibiting self-incrimination and excluding statements
obtained by prohibited interrogation techniques); id. § 949a (placing limits on use of hearsay
greater than those typical in military tribunal proceedings); Military Commission Act of 2006, §
949d (limiting exclusion of accused from proceedings); id.949f(permitting challenges to military
judge and tribunal members); id. § 949h (imposing double jeopardy rule); id § 949j (allowing
accused ability to obtain witnesses and other evidence); id. § 949k (allowing defense of lack of
mental responsibility); Military Commission Act of 2006, § 949m (requiring three-quarters vote
for sentence of more than ten years and unanimous vote for death sentence).
459. See id. § 948.
460. See id.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 294-311.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 343-62.
463. See infra text accompanying notes 494-559.
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the executive branch's primary duties is ensuring national security;
arguably, the executive should err on the side of protecting national
security. To the extent the executive-even before Congress
acted-imposed on itself a number of procedural limitations, one can
argue that it has gone beyond what one may expect of the branch charged
with ensuring national security.' In any event, Congress is the institution
that is best able to achieve the balance of interests most aligned with the
common good. The U.S. Constitution clearly delegates to Congress power
"[t]o define and punish felonies committed on the high seas and offences
against the law of nations," and "to make rules concerning captures on
land and water." 5 As the next section of this Article demonstrates,
Congress has previously fulfilled this role in situations analogous to the
present one.
C. Congress'sRole in Achieving Balance in Military
TribunalProceedings
The U.S. Constitution delegates war powers to Congress as well as the
President. 4' Congress therefore shares in the authority necessary to
determine the common good or general welfare in matters implicating
national security. An alternative constitutional arrangement could have
allocated to the executive full, or nearly full, authority in national security
matters. But the Framers recognized that the general welfare is too
complex to confidently place it entirely in the executive's hands.46 7
Although, as Commander-in-Chief, the President can be expected to act
in the nation's defense, the President may not fully appreciate other values
encompassed by the concept of the general welfare."
Historically Congress has acted, in areas affecting national security, to
promote values that it recognized as serving the common good. Two
examples illustrate the role that Congress has played in the past and may
play again. First, Congress enacted legislation after World War II that
prohibited detentions such as those of Japanese-Americans found
constitutional inKorematsuv. UnitedStates.469 Second, the Uniform Code
464. See supratext accompanying notes 425-26.
465. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
466. See supratext accompanying notes 94-97.
467. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books 1992).
Hamilton stated that "[h]owever proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive
magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would
be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years
duration."
468. See generally THE FEDERAUST Nos. 23-25 (Alexander Hamilton).
469. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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of Military Justice designates procedures for the trial of members of the
U.S. armed forces. These procedures assist in developing ways to remedy
a primary deficiency in the current military tribunal system.
1. A Response to Detention Camps for Persons of Japanese Descent:
Emergency Detention Act Legislation
In February 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No.
9066 which authorized the military to create and promulgate rules for the
protection of certain military and strategic non-military facilities.47 °
Pursuant to this Order, the military authorities excluded Americans of
Japanese descent from certain areas and created detention centers to house
them.47 1 In Korematsu, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the executive and
Congress possessed the authority to establish the detention camps.472 This
opinion was inherently suspect on several grounds. First, the Court
purported to engage in strict scrutiny when, in reality, it effectively
deferred to the executive branch.473 Second, the government treated
persons of Japanese descent differently from those persons whose ancestry
474
traced to the other two countries allied with Japan-Italy and Germany.
Third, the government failed to show why individual loyalty hearings
could not be held as a less restrictive alternative.475 The opinion smacks of
blatant anti-Japanese racism.4 76 Indeed, the United States acknowledged

470. Id.at 219-20.
471. Id.
472. Id.at 223. The Court noted that, in hindsight, although the actions might have been
unjustified, in the interests of national security the executive and Congress had the power to
authorize those camps. Id.at 224.
473. The Court stated at the beginning of its opinion that, because racial discrimination was
at 216. Nevertheless, the opinion proceeded to
involved, it was applying "rigid scrutiny." See id.
justify its holding that the detention camps were constitutional primarily "because the properly
constituted military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast... [and] because they decided
that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily." Id.at 223.
474. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
at 241 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
475. See id.
476. In his dissent, Justice Murphy detailed the contents of the military reports leading up to
the detention order. These reports contained many assertions aimed at all persons of Japanese
descent, such as the one "refer[ring] to all individuals of Japanese descent as 'subversive,' as
belonging to 'an enemy race' whose 'racial strains are undiluted."' Id.at 203 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Murphy concluded that the reasons for the military order were "largely an
accumulation of much of the misinformation, half-truths and insinuations that for years have been
directed against Japanese Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices." Id.at 239.
Justice Murphy believes that "[a] military judgment based upon such racial and sociological
considerations is not entitled to the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon strictly
military considerations." Id. at 239-40.
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as much when it granted reparations to Japanese-American citizens who
suffered interment.477
At the beginning of the Korean War, Congress enacted the Emergency
Detention Act of 1950 over President Truman's veto. 478 The ostensible
purpose of the Act was to protect the nation in a time of national
emergency by exercising the war powers of the U.S. Constitution. 9
People who posed a serious internal-security threat could be "rendered
harmless" before they had an opportunity to do damage to the United
States.480 In doing this, Congress concluded that "the precedents afforded
by court decisions sustaining the validity of the Japanese relocation
program in effect during World War H provide[d] ample authority for the
enactment of legislation [to create detention camps during national
emergencies]."4"1
This Act granted authority to establish detention camps and set forth
procedures for apprehending and detaining, during domestic security
emergencies, individuals "deemed likely to engage in espionage or
sabotage.""82 No camps were ever created and no President attempted to
use the authority granted under the Act. 4"83 However, many Americans and
members of Congress were concerned that the Act could "become an
instrumentality for apprehending and detaining citizens who hold
unpopular beliefs and views. '"" 4 Many people also feared a recurrence of
the detention camps for Japanese-Americans in World War 11.485
In 1971, Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 4001 by adding the following
language: "No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the
United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.""86 This amendment
had two purposes: first, to prohibit the establishment of detention camps,
and second, to repeal the Emergency Detention Act of 4871950, which
granted authority for the establishment of detention camps.
During the debate on the House floor, many Representatives likened
the Emergency Detention Act to the executive order in World War II that
477. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989 (West Supp. 1989) (recognizing
the "fundamental injustice" of the internment camps and promising to make restitution to "those
individuals of Japanese ancestry who were interned").
478. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435.
479. Conf. Rep. 81-3112, 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3899.
480. Id.
481. Id. at3917.
482. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2004).
487. 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1436.

TRIAL BYJURY OR BY MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR ACCUSED TERRORIST DETAINEES

created the detention camps for Japanese Americans. 88 For instance,
Representative Giaimo of Connecticut stated:
I hope that we are not ever going to repeat historically the dastardly
act which we committed in World War II of rounding up well over
100,000 Americans. They were American citizens who were
rounded up and put in detention camps and without justification...
I understand the present
bill.., will prohibit a President from doing
48 9
that in the future.
Others thought that mere repeal of the Emergency Detention Act was not
enough and believed that the President needed to be restrained.490
President Roosevelt had effectively created the detention camps
challenged in Korematsuwithout statutory or congressional authorization.
After the amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 4001, the President needed
congressional authorization before he could detain a citizen. It was seen
as both a moral and legal imperative to repeal the Emergency Detention
Act and restrain the President from repeating the use of detention camps.
Representative Railsback of Illinois, a supporter of the amendment, stated:
[I]f Congress is to go on record as against detention camps, simple
repeal is not sufficient. The committee bill provides an affirmative
prohibition against detention camps except as authorized pursuant
to an act of Congress. It was the opinion of the committee that the
absence of a Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of
detention camps might permit a return to pre-1950 status if repeal
was the only action. Thus, in order to prohibit arbitrary executive
action, H.R. 234 assures that no detention of citizens can be
undertaken by the Executive without the prior consent of the
Congress.49
Emphasizing the atrocities of the World War II detention camps and the
need to repeal the Emergency Detention Act, Rep. Railsback concluded
with these words: "Neither modification nor repeal can remove what
amounts to a national disgrace. There can be no justification for detention
4 92
camps on constitutional, national security, moral or other grounds.

488.
489.
490.
491.
492.

117CONG. REc.31539,31549(1971).
Id.
Id.
Idat31551.
Id.
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Therefore, the 1971 legislation shows Congress taking a stand in an
area related to national security because it believed that the principles
involved were too great to compromise. Although enabling the executive
to detain certain citizens to limit threats may provide some benefit to the
general welfare, certain rights are so fundamental that they require
protection even in times of threatened national security.
2. The Uniform Code of Military Justice
a. Background for, and Key Provisions of, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice
Another example of Congress's intervention in the realm of national
security is its legislation on the procedures under which members of the
U.S. armed forces may be tried. The U.S. Constitution excludes military
personnel from the protections afforded civilians accused of crimes.493
Congress, in its shared role in matters of war and national security, has a
duty to enact legislation that fosters fundamental values (like justice and
forces.494 The original
fairness) in the judicial system of the armed 495
War.'
of
Articles
"The
as
legislation was known
During World War II, the military prosecuted approximately two
million courts-martial under the version of the Articles of War then in
effect.496 Many returning veterans and the American public perceived
those proceedings as arbitrary and rife abuses.497 These concerns led to
congressional hearings and the eventual drafting and adoption of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 498 The UCMJ, created in 195 1,
493. See supra text accompanying note 172.
494. See, e.g., Ex ParteQuirin, 317 U.S. 10-12 (1942).
495. Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (repealed 1949). The Articles of War were later
reenacted as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UMCJ), 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2004).
496. See William A. Moorman, Fifty Years of MilitaryJustice: Does the Uniform Code of
MilitaryJustice Need to be Changed?,48 A.F. L. REv. 185, 187 (2000).
497. Id.
498. Id. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides many protections of individual rights
that do not exist in the civilian criminal practice. For example, warnings against self-incrimination
are given to a person suspected of an offense, even if not in custody. This protection was afforded
to military personnel sixteen years before Arizona v. Miranda.Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436
(1965) (requiring warning of any kind against self-incrimination be given to persons in police
custody). Also, military personnel accused of an offense are entitled to free military defense
counsel regardless of their economic status. To ensure that defense counsel is not pressured by his
commanding officer, service regulations promulgated by the President provide that the defense
counsel is not subject to the chain of command at the installation where he is stationed. Finally, in
stark contrast to civilian criminal defendants, military personnel who are defendants in a courtmartial are entitled to all evidence the prosecution is going to present at trial, a list of the
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has since served as the model for many systems of justice throughout the
world.499
There are three types of courts-martial: general, special, and summary.
The jurisdiction of these courts-martial is dependent on the type of
offense, the type of punishment that can be given, and the rank of the
serviceman being tried. °° The jurisdiction of general courts-martial is of
particular relevance because it has the power over "any person who by the
law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal." '' The general courtsmartial have the broadest range of jurisdiction and power, while the
summary courts-martial have the most limited.50 2 As a result of this broad
jurisdiction, the general courts-martial hear the most serious offenses
arising under the UCMJ. 5 °3 For example, the general courts-martial are the
only type of courts-martial that can hear capital cases, administer the
punishment of death, give a dishonorable discharge, or require
confinement for a term longer than six months. A general court-martial
consists of one judge and a five member panel much like a jury, or the
serviceman can choose to be tried by only ajudge.5° If the trial is a capital
trial, the number of panel members is twelve,50 5 and any conviction must
be unanimous." The members of a panel cannot be ranked lower than the
serviceman on trial.50 7 The serviceman on trial can challenge the members
of the court-similar to challenging jury members during voir dire-and
can even challenge the appointment of the particular judge presiding over
his case.50 8
Finally, the UCMJ explicitly provides that judges serving in
proceedings under the Code shall not be unduly influenced "in reaching
the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening,
approving, or reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts." 5"

prosecution's witnesses, and copies of any statements made by those witnesses to the prosecution.
10 U.S.C. § 807 (2004).
499. Theodore Essex & Leslea Tate Pickle, A Reply to the Report of the Commission on the
50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 52 A.F. L. REv. 233, 234 (2002)
(discussing the Cox Commission's recommendations for modification of the UCMJ).
500. 10 U.S.C. §§ 818-820 (2004).
501. Id. § 818.
502. Id.
503. Id. § 819.
504. Id. § 816.
505. 10 U.S.C. § 825a.
506. Id. § 852
507. Id. § 825.
508. Id. § 841.
509. Id. § 837.
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b. Decisions Comparing Fairness of Jury Trial with Proceedings Under
the UCMJ
Several U.S. Supreme Court decisions have compared trial by jury with
proceedings by courts-martial under the UCMJ. 1 ° The Court's
observations in these cases, however, must be tempered with the
knowledge that the UCMJ has since been amended. The amendments
affect many of the aspects of courts-martial proceedings that the Court
found lacking. Accordingly, an analysis of subsequent amendments will
follow a summary of the cases.
In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,51 ' an Air Force serviceman
who served in Korea was discharged," 2 arrested, and charged with
committing murder in Korea. 13 He returned to Korea to stand trial before
a court-martial." 4 In response to a habeas petition, the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia ordered his release on the basis that trying a
civilian by court-martial was unconstitutional." 5 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed" 6 reasoning that
the alleged offense occurred
military jurisdiction was appropriate because
51 7
forces.
armed
the
in
was
accused
the
while
Disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
one who is no longer in the armed forces must be charged and tried in a
civilian court, even if the offenses occurred while the accused was in the
military." Stressing fundamental differences between civilian courts and
military tribunals, the Court stated that the job of trying persons for
violations of the law "is merely incidental to an army's fighting
function."51 9 For this reason, military tribunals are designed to streamline
the litigation process: "To the extent that those responsible for
performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity
of trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served."52
However, having members of the military, rather than juries, serve as the
decision-makers also has a significant cost.52 ' As the Court observed:
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
(1955).
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

See infra text accompanying notes 511-45.
350 U.S. 11 (1955).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Toth v. Talbot, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953).
Talbot v. United States ex rel. Toth, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd, 350 U.S. 11
See id.
See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 13-23 (1955).
Id. at 15.
Id.
See id. at 18.
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"Whether right or wrong, the premise underlying the constitutional method
for determining guilt or innocence . . . is that laymen are better than
'
The Court recognized progress in
specialists to perform this task."522
"making courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department
which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. 52 3 Nevertheless,
in trial of civilians for non-military offenses, the Court concluded that a
military tribunal would not provide a constitutionally sufficient method for
trial. 24
The Court addressed a similar scenario two years later in Reid v.
Covert.25 Two companion cases presented the question of whether
spouses of active members of the U.S. armed forces could be tried by
courts-martial on charges ofmurdering their spouses.5 26 Both spouses were
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment at their courts-martial.527
In one of the cases, the lower court ordered the spouse released
pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus, but, in the other, the lower courts
refused to grant the writ.528 After the U.S. Supreme Court initially affirmed
the convictions, 5 29 a plurality of the Court on rehearing ordered the spouses
released on the ground that they could not be tried pursuant to military
jurisdiction. 30
The plurality maintained that it is "the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon."53 ' The plurality also examined the role and
procedures of the military courts and noted that military courts, while
tribunals, are
part of an organization interested primarily in discipline and
32
efficiency.
Although the plurality recognized that reforms had achieved more
protections for those accused in military trials, it also noted that such
protections were inferior to those of a civilian trial with mandatory
presentment by a grand jury and trial by a petit jury.533 Furthermore, the
President and Congress have broad discretion in determining the rules of

522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.

Id.
Toth, 350 U.S. at 17.
See id. at 15-23.
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
See id. at 3-5.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 5.
See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-41.
Id.at 40.
Id.at 36.
Id.at 37.
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procedure and evidence in military courts. 34 Following its examination of
the traditions and history behind military tribunals, the plurality concluded
that they allowed more potential arbitrariness and unfairness than
ordinarily countenanced by the U.S. Constitution.535 The plurality
emphasized the traditional subservience of the military to civilian
authorities. 36 Therefore, to protect the rights of the defendants, the
plurality affirmed the grant of writ of habeas corpus. 37
538 the Court again evaluated the procedural
In O'Callahanv. Parker,
protections afforded to the accused in the military realm as opposed to
civilian trials. In O'Callahan,the Court set forth the test for determining
whether an accused was subject to the jurisdiction .ofmilitary courts in
terms of whether there was a "service connection" in the offense
charged. 39 Although O 'Callahanwas later overruled because the "service
connection" test proved to be unworkable,' the critique of the military
justice system in O'Callahanstill provides a useful barometer of degree
to which military justice differs from civilian criminal justice. The Court
in O'Callahan started from the premise that the military and civilian
' The Court found the most
systems have "fundamental differences."541
striking difference in the distinction between the civilian system, with a
lay jury as its bedrock, and the military system composed of military
personnel. 42 The Court observed that the presiding officer at courtsmartial was not a professional judge, much less a judge with any
independence 43 Indeed, the Court stated that "the possibility of influence
on the actions of the courts-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects
its members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct
command authority over its members is a pervasive one in military law,
despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger." 5" In short, the Court
concluded that a "civilian trial... is held in an atmosphere conducive to

534. Id.at 38.
535. Reid, 354 U.S. at 39-40.
536. Id.
537. See id.
538. 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
539. See id.
540. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 440-51 (1987) (abandoning "service
connection" and ruling that the test would hinge on the status of the accused-i.e., whether he or
she was in the armed forces when tried-as opposed to the connection of the conduct to service
functions).
541. O'Callahan,395 U.S. at 262.
542. Id.at 263.
543. Id.at 264
544. Id.
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the protection of individual rights, while a military trial is marked by the
'
age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice." 45
c. Legislative Efforts to Address Unlawful Command Influence in
Military Proceedings
Unlawful command influence has been called the "mortal enemy of
military justice. '54 6 It involves the improper interference by a higherranking officer who has authority over the persons responsible for making
the judicial decision." It deprives persons tried under court-martial
proceedings of their constitutional rights-including the deprivation of the
right to favorable evidence, the deprivation of effective assistance of
counsel, and the deprivation of an impartial forum.548 Because it creates
substantial problems of unfairness, unlawful command influence is
prohibited by the UCMJ.549 Furthermore, the 1968 Military Justice Act
placed additional prohibitions on unlawful command influence." °
In an attempt to reduce unlawful command influence and thus make
court-martial proceedings more fundamentally fair, Congress enacted at
least three safeguards."' 1 First, commanding officers are forbidden from
attempting to influence judicial proceedings. 52 Following is the language
with which the UCMJ expresses the desired independence of the decisionmakers:
No authority convening a general, special, or summary courtmartial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure,
reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge,
or counsel thereof, with respect to findings or sentence adjudged by
the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his functions
in the conduct of the proceeding ... "'
Second, Congress allowed disciplinary action against anyone who
obstructs court-martial proceedings." 4 Third, Congress has made it clear
that "defense counsel may not receive less favorable reports because of
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

Id. at 266.
United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (1986).
CHARLES A. SHANOR & L. LYNN HOGUE, MILITARY LAW 117 (1996).
Thomas, 22 M.J. at 393.
10 U.S.C. § 837 (2004).
Thomas, 22 M.J. at 393.

551. SHANOR& HOGUE, supra note 547, at 117.

552. 10 U.S.C. § 837.
553. Id.
554. Id. § 898.
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zealous advocacy."555 In addition to the procedural safeguards provided by
Congress, the courts have also taken a stand against unlawful command
influence. For example, even though a defendant can waive almost any
error, unlawful command influence can never be waived.556 Furthermore,
the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
unlawful command influence has not occurred.5 57 Finally, the Military
Justice Act of 1968 created professional military judges558 in order to
ensure that the judge assigned to court-martial proceedings is not under the
command of the convening authority. 9
D. A Modest Proposal
Perhaps the only remaining deficiency in the current military tribunal
procedures is the lack of an effective buffer between the prosecuting
authority and the judges deciding the fate of the accused. In the Military
Commission Act of 2006, Congress included a section prohibiting
members of tribunals from suffering ill-treatment for their participation or
decisions.56 By including such a provision, Congress implicitly recognizes
that the problem exists of pressures on military tribunal proceedings that
inject a factor into deliberations that should not be there. We would be
naive to think that a commissioned officer who acquits an alleged enemy
combatant will feel uninhibited in doing so solely because a section of the
Act says that he or she will suffer no consequences.
Perhaps in classic military tribunals, it was worth sacrificing the full
protection of an accused from subtle influences on the tribunal members
affecting their judgment. The reality that Congress has now created an
entirely new justice system-tailored for alleged enemy combatants being
tried away from the theater of war-is a tacit recognition that these
military tribunal proceedings are essentially a hybrid system. One need
only review the lengthy procedures now in place to see that one is dealing
with a different form of military tribunal from those in the past. While
applauding Congress for stepping into its proper role, this Article must still
take note of the weaknesses of the system-the lack of an effective buffer
between the military and the accused.
This weakness is most acute in cases in which the death penalty can be
imposed. The current procedures require unanimity among the military
555. Id. § 837.
556. United States v. Osburn, 33 M.J. 810, 812 (1991).
557. Id.
558. 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
559. Id.
560. S. 3980, 109th Cong. § 949b (prohibiting command from influencing, and members from
being ill-treated for participation in tribunals).

TRIAL BYJURY OR BY MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR ACCUSED TERRORIST DETAINEES

tribunal members in any case imposing capital punishment. 6 ' However,
even the unanimity requirement is insufficient because military officials
are the only members of the tribunals. Consequently, the decision-maker
remains a part of the branch of government prosecuting the accused.
Blackstone's warning is as timely today as it was when issued over two
centuries ago:
[I]n times of difficulty and danger, more is to be apprehended from
the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the crown, in
suits between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one
individual and another, to settle the metes and boundaries of private
property. Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and twofold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury, between the
'
liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the crown."562
If the accused faces danger from judges appointed by the executive, he
still clearly faces as much or more danger from military officers appointed
by the executive. Yet, legitimate reasons support trying accused unlawful
combatants before military tribunals, as opposed to the civilian courts.563
Nor is a lay jury an ideal alternative to these tribunals. For example, in
terrorism cases, Ireland has tried and abandoned the use of lay juries, in
part because of the potential danger to the jurors themselves.5" Simply
because a classic lay jury may prove impractical, however, does not negate
the propriety of utilizing an alternative somewhere between the all561. Id. § 949m (2006).
562. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 27 (17651769).
563. A chief advantage of military tribunals is the ability to protect classified information and
sources. Although the impact of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C.A.
app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2004), on military tribunals is outside the scope of this Article, it should be noted
that two particular scenarios arise under the CIPA. The first is when the criminal defendant seeks
to disclose classified information in his defense. The second is when the criminal defendant seeks
the information for his defense and exoneration. The CIPA applies only to the former. Id. §§ 5-6.
In a recent D.C. Circuit case, Judge Hens Green specified the rules and procedures for discovery
by civilian defense attorneys representing Guantanamo Bay detainees. In re Guantanamo Bay
Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2004).
564. As part of what is known as the "Diplock system," named after the English jurist who
chaired a commission to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland in 1972, the UK Parliament passed
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1996, c. 22 (Eng.) which abolished layjuries for
terrorism trials. The Diplock rationale claimed to: (1) prevent intimidation ofjurors and (2) prevent
jurors from voting according to their political aspirations. LEGISLATION AGAINST TERRORISM, 1998,
Cm 4178, availableat http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm41/4178/4178.
htm; SUBMISSION BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TO THE DIPLOCK
REVIEW, availableat http://www.caj.org.uk/keydocs/ DiplockReview.html.
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military tribunal and the full-layperson jury. Countries employing a civil
code system already use procedures ensuring some independence between
the prosecuting authority and the bench.565 The UCMJ effectively does so
as well, though perhaps to a lesser extent.
In other words, the inclusion of some civilian members in the military
tribunals provides some balance to the procedures. Indeed, the trial ofNazi
war criminals in the celebrated Nuremberg trials occurred before tribunals
that were composed of prominent civilian jurists from Allied countries.566
Notably, those from the United States were active or retired judges who
served on state supreme and appellate courts.567
If but one civilian judge served on each military tribunal, the accused
would at least have a minimum level of protection against imposition of
the death penalty by a tribunal composed solely of persons appointed by,
and answerable to, the President. The requirement of unanimity before
imposition of the death penalty would then prove crucial. A single civilian
member could prevent imposition of the death penalty by refusing to vote
for capital punishment. In addition, Congress should borrow some of the
provisions in the UCMJ designed to promote independence of those
military personnel serving on the tribunals. Just as members of a courtmartial under the UCMJ should have some assurance of insulation from
the repercussions of their decisions, Congress could add provisions that
provide meaningful penalties for anyone to "censure, reprimand, or
admonish... with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged ...or with
respect to any other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the
proceedings."568
Congress has now-to a great extent-filled its role of determining
appropriate procedures for trial of persons captured in military
engagements. It has recognized, and vindicated, the necessity for fair
trails. However, Congress should now finish the task it started in the
Military Commission Act of 2006. It may do so by enacting an amendment
prescribing that at least one member in each military tribunal be a civilian
when the changes carry the potential for the death penalty. Indeed,
Congress could take the approach that the Department of Defense took in
565. See supra text accompanying notes 343-62.
566. See, e.g., WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 34 (1999); JOSEPH E. PERSICO,
NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL, 132-33 (1994). Actually, only the Soviet judges at the trial of the
top 22 Nazis carried military ranks. The American, British, and French judges were civilian jurists.
567. PERSICO, supranote 566, at 60-62 (discussing the appointment of Francis Biddle, former
attorney general under Franklin Roosevelt, to represent the United States as a Justice on the
International Military Tribunal; see also TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10; NUREMBERG, OCTOBER 1946-APRIL
1949(1997).
568. See 10 U.S.C. § 837 (2004).
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appointing civilians to the Review Panels under the original procedures
now displaced by the Military Commission Act of 2006.69 Under a statute
allowing these civilians to temporarily become part of the Armed
Forces, 7 ' any obligations to ensure confidentiality could be protected.
Any amended legislation should take care to specify that it shall not
apply to military tribunals employed on battlefields. None of the trials
currently scheduled of accused terrorists would occur in such a situation.
However, one can envision future scenarios in which the military
authorities might conduct trials on the field of combat. The prospect of
such trials in the future should not, however, prevent Congress from acting
now to ensure basic fairness in present-day trials.
VI. CONCLUSION

One of the challenging messages conveyed to our country in the 9/11
Commission Report was that we must educate the world of that for which
our Nation stands. This message is not the one of the fanatic who suggests
we summarily execute terrorists so as to deter terrorism."' Rather, the
message is one that recognizes the unique contribution of America-the
recognition that the common good or general welfare depends in part on
the protection of fundamental individual rights. Although the U.S.
Constitution gives the government flexibility in areas of national security,
it does not reject the fundamental rights routinely enforced in times of
peace. The job of protecting such rights, however, shifts largely to
Congress. Therefore, those who criticize the executive branch for failing
to protect those subject to trial in the military tribunals are pointing their
fingers in the wrong direction. In the past, Congress has exercised its
delegated function under Article I, section 8 to legislate systems and
procedures that ensure fundamental fairness in trials not covered by
constitutional guarantees. The question that this Article has explored is
whether Congress has intervened sufficiently in its recent legislation. The
answer is that, though Congress has gone far in that direction, one last
critical step should be taken. Ironically it is a step already shown to be
569. See supranotes 11-12, 231-32 and accompanying text.
570. See supranotes 11-12, 231-32 and accompanying text.
571. One can find such an approach urged in messages posted at various Internet web sites,
such as www.asininity.com or www.libertypost.org. The advocacy of summary executions
approaches Nazism. Hitler's October 18, 1942 Commando Order provided, for instance: "From
now on all men operating against German troops in so-called Commando raids ... are to be
annihilated to the last man.... Even if these individuals on discovery ... give themselves up as
prisoners, no pardon is on any account to be given." See http://www.combinedops.com/Hitlers_
CommandoOrder.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
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practicable by the Department of Defense's own appointment of civilians
to now-defunct Review Panels.572
The principle on which the right to ajury trial rests-the essential need
for impartiality in the decision-maker-is essential to any system seeking
to do justice. In other words, while a system may omit certain other rights
that ordinarily would apply in the civilian criminal justice system, this
principle is one that cannot be omitted. However, it may be respected in
some form other than by providing a lay jury. Although, there are certain
instances, such as trials in theaters of active combat, in which trials before
military officers are the only alternative, the upcoming trials of enemy
combatants do not rise to the same level. Make no mistake about it,
though, the trials of the accused terrorists will themselves be
extraordinary. The accused terrorists are not the only ones who will be on
trial. "Courts try cases," as Associate Justice (and Nuremberg prosecutor)
Jackson said, "but cases also try courts. 57 3 Cases try countries, too. May
ours do as well in these upcoming trials as we and the Allied Forces did
in Nuremberg. The more unsympathetic the defendants, the more
important it is to provide just tribunals and just procedures. With modest
adjustments, the current military tribunals can provide trials consistent
with the transcendent values on which our nation was founded.

572. See supra notes 11-12, 231-32 and accompanying text.
573. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 15.

